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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

COVID-19 AND DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING:
REGULATING THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE
Divya Ramjee, Pollyanna Sanderson, & Imran Malek†

Digital surveillance tools—technological means of monitoring, tracking, and
notifying—are at the forefront of public health response strategies for the COVID-

† Divya Ramjee is a PhD candidate at American University in Washington, D.C., in the
Department of Justice, Law & Criminology. Her research interests include cybercrime and
intellectual property crime, biotechnology, and the application of artificial intelligence
methodologies in the fields of criminology, law, and security. This author is currently employed by
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ); the views expressed in this Article are exclusively those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the DOJ, its components, or the United
States. Pollyanna Sanderson is a Policy Counsel at Future of Privacy Forum and was previously a
Google Public Policy Fellow, resident at the National Consumers League. Her primary focus is
privacy legislation at the federal and state levels. She has previously written and spoken about
digital contact tracing applications both within the United States and internationally. The views
herein do not necessarily reflect those of Future of Privacy Forum supporters or board members.
Imran Malek is an Associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. Prior to earning his
JD from Boston University, he was a product manager and software engineer focused on the
intersection of digital advertising, machine learning, and data portability. The views herein do not
necessarily reflect those of Skadden Arps, its staff, or its clients.
Robust digital public health surveillance warrants interdisciplinary guidance, and as such,
we greatly thank the following experts for their advice and recommendations: Andrew Sellars, JD,
Boston University; Maimuna Majumder, PhD, Harvard Medical School; Angela Rasmussen, PhD,
Columbia University; Saskia Popescu, PhD, MPH, MA, University of Arizona; Joseph Amon, PhD,
MSPH, Drexel University; Natalie E. Dean, PhD, AM, University of Florida; Jessica Malaty
Rivera, MS, The COVID Tracking Project; Elsa B. Kania, PhD (cand., Harvard University),
Technology and National Security Program, Center for a New American Security; Katelyn
Ringrose, JD, Future of Privacy Forum; Margaret Cunningham, PhD, Forcepoint; Ghinwa El
Hayek, MPH, American University of Beirut; and Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna, PhD, JD, LLM, Future

101

102

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2021

19 pandemic. Comprehensive and effective digital public health surveillance
requires that public health authorities, regulatory powers, and developers consider
interdisciplinary approaches. This entails accounting for the use of proximity data
and Bluetooth technology; notification systems from technology companies; and
laws and regulations associated with health information, biometric privacy, and
mobile data. Of particular importance is incorporation of epidemiological
considerations in development and implementation of digital tools, including
usability across mobile devices, interoperability, regulation of literacy and
disability compatibility, and incentivization for adoption. It is both feasible and
prudent that the United States establish a federal network for public health
surveillance aided by digital tools, especially considering that waves of COVID-19
are expected to continue well into 2021 and while the threat of other emerging
infectious diseases persists.
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INTRODUCTION

Given the scale of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic, dependence on traditional contact tracing1 alone may prove
insufficient for countries to effectively and efficiently track and trace
the spread of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2).2 With continued reliance on digital connectivity for numerous
aspects of our lives, digital surveillance tools provide a potential
opportunity to supplement existing contact tracing initiatives by
facilitating the fast identification of known and unknown contacts.3
Pressure is mounting to develop epidemiologically-useful digital
tools, as states across the United States continue lifting stay-at-home
orders and attempt to return to normal operations.4 Over twenty states
are currently considering, designing, or implementing digital contact
tracing tools.5 The accelerated development and launch of these tools

1 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT
TRACING: PART OF A MULTIPRONGED APPROACH TO FIGHT THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/php/principles-contact-tracingbooklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/364U-S9KX] [hereinafter CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND
CONTACT TRACING]; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of
Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and
Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 14, 16 (1998) (noting that
traditional methods involved humans in the field conducting voluntary interviews with infected
persons to determine their relevant location histories and other persons who may have been in their
vicinity).
2 Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Suggests Epidemic Control with
Digital Contact Tracing, 368 SCIENCE 619 (2020).
3 See generally EUROPEAN CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, MOBILE
APPLICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CONTACT TRACING FOR COVID-19: A GUIDANCE FOR EU/EEA
MEMBER STATES (2020), https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/covid-19-mobileapplications-support-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/URB7-2VPV] [hereinafter ECDC, MOBILE
APPLICATIONS].
4 Digital Contact Tracing Can Slow or Even Stop Coronavirus Transmission and Ease Us Out
of Lockdown, BIG DATA INST. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.bdi.ox.ac.uk/news/digital-contacttracing-can-slow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown
[https://
perma.cc/85MC-8TDJ] [hereinafter Digital Contact Tracing].
5 Dave Burke, An Update on Exposure Notifications, GOOGLE: KEYWORD (July 31, 2020),
https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/update-exposure-notifications/amp
[https://perma.cc/2TT2-3KSW].
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demand that we consider the interests of privacy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in shaping the future of digital surveillance for emerging
infectious disease threats and other existing public health issues.6
This Article discusses important aspects for the development and
implementation of digital contact tracing tools, the demand for robust
data stewardship, and the need for the U.S. federal government to
create a regulatory framework for governing these tools and any future
surveillance technologies for public health. Of importance are: (1) the
overall development and regulation of digital surveillance tools within
the context of epidemiology;7 (2) requirements related to protected
health and medical information;8 (3) the formulation of a federal
contact tracing program compared to state-level solutions;9 and (4)
security and privacy concerns about cellphone tracking data.10
However, considerations need to be made regarding: (1) important
factors for user interfaces to promote adoption of the tools;11 and (2)
alternative solutions to contact tracing apps that may be better options
for nationwide, and even global, public health surveillance.12 It would
be feasible for the U.S. government to establish a national network for
contact tracing, and considering that waves of COVID-19 are expected
to continue well into 2021, the time to take a proactive stance is now.
I. DEVELOPING DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE TOOLS

Contact tracing is a well-established method of tracking and
tracing the spread of a virus to slow, and potentially stop, virus
transmission during outbreaks.13 Typically, case investigators conduct

6 Privacy in the Age of COVID: IDAC Gets Results from COVID-19 Apps Report, INT’L DIGIT.
ACCOUNTABILITY COUNCIL, https://digitalwatchdog.org/privacy-in-the-age-of-covid-idac-getsresults-from-covid-19-apps-report [https://perma.cc/7KV4-3ZNE] [hereinafter IDAC]; see also
Maimuna S. Majumder & Angel N. Desai, How Contact Tracing Apps Could Help Prevent COVID19 Super-Spreader Events, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://issues.org/how-contacttracing-apps-covid-19-super-spreaders-majumder-desai [https://perma.cc/D8C5-XUSD].
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part IV.
11 See infra Part V.
12 See infra Part VI.
13 Gostin & Hodge, supra note 1.
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interviews with positively diagnosed individuals to establish their
movements and interactions in order to identify, notify, and interview
others possibly infected.14 However, traditional techniques are limited
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its scale, particularly
given the possibility of transmission between strangers and
asymptomatic carriers.15
Additionally, a trust deficit exists that reduces the willingness of
many individuals to provide information about their whereabouts and
interactions to government entities16—exacerbated by virally
syndicated misinformation.17 The design and implementation of
digital contact tracing tools, and exposure notification18 tools, should
be grounded in the principle of proportionality,19 establishing data

14

CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING, supra note 1.
W. Joost Wiersinga et al., Pathophysiology, Transmission, Diagnosis, and Treatment of
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): A Review, 324 JAMA 782 (2020); see also Interim
Clinical Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19),
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 8, 2020) , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/
2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management-patients.html [https://perma.cc/4KHW-ZGFU].
16 HARSHA PANDURANGA, LAURA HECHT-FELELLA & RAYA KOREH, GOVERNMENT ACCESS
TO MOBILE PHONE DATA FOR CONTACT TRACING: A STATUTORY PRIMER (2020), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/2020_05_21_ContactTracingPrimer_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WW7-NVHM]. It is essential to note that the trust deficit stems from how
contact tracing is handled rather than being inherent in the disease. See also Alice Miranda Ollstein
& Darius Tahir, Contact Tracing Foiled by Conspiracy Theories, Lack of Federal Messaging,
POLITICO (Sept. 3, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/03/contact-tracingconspiracy-theories-trump-messaging-408611 [https://perma.cc/6HF3-6YPP] (noting that
President Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, has “mocked contact tracing, while several state and
local GOP officials and candidates have boasted about refusing to provide information after testing
positive and called the practice ‘communist’”).
17 See generally ZOIS BOUKOUVALAS ET AL., INDEPENDENT COMPONENT ANALYSIS FOR
TRUSTWORTHY CYBERSPACE DURING HIGH IMPACT EVENTS: AN APPLICATION TO COVID-19
(2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.01284.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EG9-FJEU].
18 There are important distinctions between contact tracing and exposure notification apps. In
comparison to contact tracing apps, where people log information that is then shared with public
health authorities, exposure notification apps notify a user if they have been in a nearby proximity
to someone who later tests positive for SARS-CoV-2. Importantly, exposure notification apps
would not tell when or where a user was potentially exposed to the virus. From an epidemiological
perspective, contact tracing is more beneficial in that it helps epidemiologists and public health
officials trace and map spreads of outbreaks based on location data.
19 “Proportionality” is closely related to justifiability. To determine the justifiability of a
privacy-invasive measure, it is important to weigh the risks of intervening against anticipated public
health benefits, as well as the risks associated with not intervening. Whether a contact tracing app
is “proportionate” depends on the actual or potential consequences of opting-in to the system. This
may vary depending on whether other functionalities are bundled into the app (e.g., quarantine
enforcement), what information is collected, how long it is stored for, what it is used for, and who
has access to it (e.g., law or immigration enforcement).
15
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collection and processing at a scale that is: (1) proportional to the
severity of the public-health threat; (2) limited to what is minimally
necessary for achieving specific public-health objectives; and
(3) scientifically justified.20 And notably, the recent partnership
between Google and Apple is driving the design of contact tracing and
exposure notification apps and other digital notification systems.
A.

The Significance of the Google & Apple Partnership

Google and Apple partnered to provide a novel contact tracing
application programming interface (API).21 The Google-Apple
Exposure Notification (GAEN) API is inspired by the European
consortium Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
protocol (DP-3T) for exposure notification, and enables expanded
access to Bluetooth scanning for apps using the API, improving the
ability for signal detection between Android and Apple devices.22 The
API also smooths operating functions and spares battery life but only
for official public health authority (PHA) apps that adopt a
decentralized design and abide by their Terms of Service (Terms).23
These Terms stipulate that the collection of location data is
prohibited, data must be used only for COVID-19 response efforts,
and developers must follow their retention limitation and non-

20 Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, On the Responsible Use of Digital Data to Tackle the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 26 NATURE MED. 463, 463 (2020); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO GUIDE THE USE OF DIGITAL PROXIMITY TRACKING
TECHNOLOGIES FOR COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING 3 (2020), https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Ethics_Contact_tracing_apps-2020.1
[https://perma.cc/8HL9-UU8T];
WILLIAM J. BUTLER, AM. ASS’N FOR THE INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, Introduction to SIRACUSA
PRINCIPLES ON THE LIMITATION AND DEROGATION PROVISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 3, 3−4 (1985), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/
uploads/1984/07/Siracusa-principles-ICCPR-legal-submission-1985-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
KFS4-AM2S].
21 APIs provide a technical method for apps to retrieve, process, and share device information.
See Exposure Notifications: Using Technology to Help Public Health Authorities Fight COVID19, GOOGLE , https://www.google.com/covid19/exposurenotifications [https://perma.cc/F47XF3WV] [hereinafter GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Terms].
22 See generally CARMELA TRONCOSO ET AL., DECENTRALIZED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
PROXIMITY TRACING 20, 30–35 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.12273.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZZN3-RASL] (noting that the GAEN API allows devices to send, receive, and keep track of a
random set of rotating Bluetooth identifiers broadcast by other users of the app).
23 GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Terms, supra note 21.
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discrimination requirements.24 Apps using the API must also obtain
user consent for both app installation and the processing and sharing
of positive diagnoses.25 The apps must also allow users to uninstall the
apps.26 PHAs retain the power to determine the criteria to trigger an
exposure notification and app customization, such as adding a
symptom tracker or case mapper (e.g., the contact tracing app used in
the United Kingdom).27
Some locales have cited inadequate technical expertise and lack
of resources as a barrier to implementing contact tracing or exposure
notification apps.28 In September 2020, Apple and Google launched
Exposure Notification Express, making exposure notification
functionality a native component in operating systems of Apple and
Android devices, which removed the need to download an app and
lowered the barrier to entry for PHAs.29 Individuals merely need to
opt-in to participation following a system update, sidestepping the
hurdle of downloading a specialized app.30 However, functionality is
only available when supported by a PHA that must deploy a “test
verification server”31 to validate positive diagnoses during key
uploads, and a “key server”32 to handle key uploads and downloads.

24

Id.
See id. (noting that the technology only works if users “decide to opt-in” and that if a user
changes their mind, they “can turn it off at any time”); Matt Burgess, Everything You Need to Know
About the New NHS Contact Tracing App, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:45 BST), https://
www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-covid-19-tracking-app-contact-tracing
[https://perma.cc/R8UMQLL4].
26 Burgess, supra note 25.
27 Id.
28 Jon Swartz, Apple, Google Enhance Contact-Tracing Technology to Help Combat COVID19, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 1, 2020, 12:02 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/applegoogle-enhance-contact-tracing-technology-to-help-combat-covid-19-2020-09-01
[https://
perma.cc/TC9W-LKTA].
29 Supporting Exposure Notifications Express, APPLE DEV., https://developer.apple.com/
documentation/exposurenotification/supporting_exposure_notifications_express
[https://
perma.cc/RN75-C43Q] (noting that the system includes the same privacy protections as the GAEN
API, and may be utilized concurrently with the API for apps).
30 Setting Up an Exposure Notifications Express Test Verification Server, APPLE DEV., https://
developer.apple.com/documentation/exposurenotification/supporting_exposure_notifications_
express/setting_up_an_exposure_notifications_express_test_verification_server [https://perma.cc/
JXZ7-BX5Z].
31 Id.
32 Configuring a Key Server for Exposure Notifications Express, APPLE DEV., https://
developer.apple.com/documentation/exposurenotification/supporting_exposure_notifications_
25
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PHAs remain responsible for determining risk exposure and
customizing system notifications and alerts. Washington, D.C.,
Maryland, Nevada, and Virginia are expected to be among the first
U.S. states and territories to implement Exposure Notification
Express, with others likely to follow.33
1.

Issues of Interoperability

For contact tracing to be effective, an app or digital tool from one
state must be cross-compatible with those developed in another state.
With people increasingly travelling across state borders, the ability for
apps and digital tools to recognize one another is absolutely crucial for
tracing exposures and preventing new hotspots of infection from
emerging.34 Inconsistencies between state-level contact tracing apps
could cause significant interoperability issues, particularly if some
apps are centralized and others are decentralized.35 The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that if apps are not
interoperable, this could add burden on PHAs for integrating data
seamlessly into their case management, contact tracing systems, and
workflows, which would further exacerbate issues of siloed data
management amongst state authorities.36
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has encouraged
European Member States to have “a common European approach in
express/configuring_a_key_server_for_exposure_notifications_express [https://perma.cc/6PPJZZRV].
33 Darrell Etherington, Apple Launches COVID-19 ‘Exposure Notification Express’ with iOS
13.7—Android to Follow Later This Month, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 1, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://
techcrunch.com/2020/09/01/apple-launches-system-level-covid-19-exposure-notification-expresswith-ios-13-7-google-to-follow-later-this-month [https://perma.cc/294G-ABT8].
34 EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., STATEMENT ON THE DATA PROTECTION IMPACT OF THE
INTEROPERABILITY OF CONTACT TRACING APPS (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/
files/file1/edpb_statementinteroperabilitycontacttracingapps_en_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7RUEUAS] [hereinafter EDPB, DATA PROTECTION IMPACT]; see also Marshall Allen, Cellphone Data
Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling with Lives” Across the Country, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 18, 2020,
5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/cellphone-data-shows-how-las-vegas-is-gamblingwith-lives-across-the-country [https://perma.cc/VM96-RPBG].
35 Kelly Servick, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Are Coming to a Phone Near You. How
Will We Know Whether They Work?, SCIENCE (May 21, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://
www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/countries-around-world-are-rolling-out-contact-tracing-appscontain-coronavirus-how [https://perma.cc/ZU2C-YYSV]; EDPB, DATA PROTECTION IMPACT,
supra note 34; Allen, supra note 34.
36 CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING, supra note 1.
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response to the current crisis, or at least put in place an interoperable
framework.”37 The EDPB stated that “[i]n order to promote the
effective application of data protection principles, a common level of
data minimisation and a common data retention period should be
considered.”38 The EDPB also stressed that interoperability should not
lead to increased collection of information, due to a lack of
coordinated approach, or to decreased data security or data accuracy.39
Furthermore, the EDPB stated that “ensuring interoperability of
[contact tracing apps with different underlying approaches] is
technically challenging and may require substantial financial and
engineering effort.”40
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Rhode Island were
among the first to implement contact tracing apps not based on the
Apple Google API.41 In contrast to these contact tracing apps, which
are centralized and can be location- or Bluetooth-based, exposure
notification apps are decentralized Bluetooth-based apps that can use
the GAEN API. A few states in the United States have initiated
development of their own exposure notification apps, with Virginia42
being the first state to deploy an official app, followed by Alabama,
North Dakota, and Wyoming.43 With the use of the GAEN API, there
is potential for these and other state-level exposure notification apps
to be connected via shared protocols to streamline data collection and

37

EDPB, DATA PROTECTION IMPACT, supra note 34, at 1.
Id. at 4.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Healthy Together App, UTAH.GOV, https://coronavirus.utah.gov/healthy-together-app
[https://perma.cc/PT4K-AXSL]; see also Care19 Alert, ND.GOV, https://ndresponse.gov/covid-19resources/care19 [https://perma.cc/8DWR-K77A]; Care19 Diary App, COVID-19 IN SOUTH
DAKOTA, https://covid.sd.gov/care19app.aspx [https://perma.cc/PBT4-ED2Q]; Crush COVID RI,
R.I.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH,
https://covid.ri.gov/protect-your-household/crush-covid-ri
[https://perma.cc/DXM8-EKSQ].
42 Sarah McCammon, Virginia Unveils App to Aid Contact Tracing, NPR (Aug. 5, 2020, 5:14
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/08/05/899414953/virginiaunveils-app-to-aid-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/4HLZ-N4WH].
43 Paresh Dave, Three More U.S. States Launching Coronavirus Exposure Warning Apps,
REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-appsidUSKCN2592WR [https://perma.cc/97W3-2PS4].
38
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sharing.44 In mid-July 2020, the Association of Public Health
Laboratories also announced that it will host a national key server to
support all U.S. states, allowing exposure notification app users to
receive alerts even when travelling across state borders.45
Additionally, Google updated its Exposure Notification System to
provide PHAs more flexibility in determining the level of risk
associated with detected exposure, improve accuracy detection, and
support for inter-country interoperability.46
Interstate interoperability for both contact tracing and exposure
notification apps could be authorized and implemented through the
U.S. Congress’s power to regulate interstate commercial activity.47
Some states may instead argue that public health measures, such as
involuntary quarantines, are reserved for states to use at their
discretion.48 It is in absence of federal regulation that states and
territories retain the ability to exercise their powers to establish
protocols, which could undermine interoperability.49 Furthermore, the
complete lack of a federal solution creates an imbalance between
states with varying levels of funding and technological sophistication
among their public health departments. This imbalance creates a
unique opportunity for private sector actors like “Big Tech” firms to
effectively parachute into public health departments and provide turn-

44 Privacy in the Time of COVID-19, BBB NAT’L PROGRAMS (May 27, 2020), https://
betterbusiness.blubrry.com/2020/05/27/privacy-in-the-time-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/4LVT9XCM].
45 Bringing COVID-19 Exposure Notification to the Public Health Community, ASS’N PUB.
HEALTH LAB’YS (July 17, 2020), https://www.aphlblog.org/bringing-covid-19-exposurenotification-to-the-public-health-community [https://perma.cc/H29Y-RRMX].
46 Burke, supra note 5.
47 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (establishing that the “Commerce Clause” provides
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes”).
48 Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
49 Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939). In South Carolina, the legislature passed a bill at the
end of June 2020 that prevented the expenditure of federal COVID-19 relief funds by the local
health department for “any applications created for [contact tracing] on a cellular device.” A Joint
Resolution to Authorize the Expenditure of Federal Funds Disbursed to the State in the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, and to Specify the Manner in Which the Funds May be
Expended, 2020 S.C. Acts 142; see also Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Within a week, the California legislature passed a
similar bill to prevent federal funding for contact tracing from being “used by any state or local
entity for applications that collect information related to an individual’s location and movement.”
An Act to Amend the Budget Act of 2020, 2020 Cal. Stats. ch. 7, § 11.95.
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key contact tracing solutions, as seen with GAEN.50 In practice, states
(which often have small cybersecurity budgets) must contract with a
private developer to develop an app, host the data if centralized, and
maintain information security.51 Divergence between state-offered
apps could result in multiple apps with differing security issues.
B.

Designing Contact Tracing Apps

The two major technologies involved in app development are
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology (associated with
location data) and Bluetooth technology (associated with proximity
data).52 While some countries have adopted privacy-invasive
surveillance strategies that rely on multiple pieces of personal
information,53 others instead have developed contact tracing apps for
individuals to download onto their smartphones including: (1)
centralized location-based apps that typically rely on GPS location,
WiFi, and cell tower data; (2) centralized Bluetooth-based apps; and
(3) decentralized Bluetooth-based apps, as in exposure notification
apps.54

50 Paresh Dave, Google Says 20 U.S. States, Territories ‘Exploring’ Contact Tracing Apps,
REUTERS (July 31, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ooronavirus-apps/
google-says-20-u-s-states-territories-exploring-contact-tracing-apps-idUSKCN24W2P1 [https://
perma.cc/9YM9-JAXN].
51 Gregory Barber, Google and Apple Change Tactics on Contact Tracing Tech, WIRED (Sept.
1, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-apple-change-tactics-contact-tracing-tech
[https://perma.cc/QLD5-5YLK] (noting that “it was up to states to build apps . . . and integrate
them into their public health response”).
52 JOHNS HOPKINS PROJECT ON ETHICS & GOVERNANCE OF DIGIT. CONTACT TRACING
TECHS., DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE: ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE
GUIDANCE 35–42 (Jeffrey P. Kahn ed., 2020), https://muse.jhu.edu/book/75831/pdf [https://
perma.cc/7G37-46ZB] [hereinafter JOHNS HOPKINS PROJECT].
53 Digital Contact Tracing, supra note 4 (noting that China, South Korea, and Taiwan adopted
privacy-invasive surveillance approaches for aggregating data on people who have tested positive
for SARS-CoV-2, combining personal information from a variety of sources including closedcircuit television footage, credit-card transactions, and location data from cell-phone carriers).
54 Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tate Ryan-Mosley & Bobbie Johnson, A Flood of Coronavirus Apps
Are Tracking Us. Now It’s Time to Keep Track of Them, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020), https://
www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covid-tracing-tracker [https://
perma.cc/WD5F-WQ9J]; see also Apple & Google, Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing, APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing [https://perma.cc/R56Q-LDCX].
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Centralized Location-Based Apps

Centralized location-based contact tracing apps were the first to
be deployed during the beginning months of the pandemic, such as
Israel’s “HaMagen” in March 2020.55 Within this design category,
location data is typically stored in two main ways. Israel’s app stores
data on the internal memory of mobile devices, and with consent, this
data may be transferred to a centralized server if an individual tests
positive for SARS-CoV-2.56 In contrast, Norway, Bahrain, and Kuwait
opted for apps that carry out “live or near-live tracking of users’
locations by frequently uploading GPS coordinates to a central
server.”57 This information is easily linked to individual users, as each
of these countries requires users to register with a national ID number
or valid phone number.58
However, GPS technology has documented issues with
pinpointing a device’s movements, particularly in instances requiring
differentiation between adjoining buildings.59 Experts have stated,
“[c]urrent localization technologies [i.e., GPS location and WiFi] are
not as accurate as the use of Bluetooth-based proximity detection, and
may not be accurate enough to be consistent with medically suggested

55 Tova Cohen, 1.5 Million Israelis Using Voluntary Coronavirus Monitoring App, REUTERS
(Apr. 1, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-israel-apps/1-5million-israelis-using-voluntary-coronavirus-monitoring-app-idUSKBN21J5L5 [https://perma.cc/
J72X-YT83].
56 Hamagen Privacy Policy, MINISTRY OF HEALTH (June 17, 2020, 11:49 AM), https://
govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/Privacy-policy-EN
[https://perma.cc/8GP7JS6T].
57 Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway Contact Tracing Apps Among Most Dangerous for Privacy,
AMNESTY INT’L (June 16, 2020, 06:40 UTC), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/
bahrain-kuwait-norway-contact-tracing-apps-danger-for-privacy [https://perma.cc/6MAN-GP4K]
[hereinafter Bahrain]. Due to proportionality concerns associated with this design, highlighted in
an Amnesty International report, Norway suspended deployment of their app soon after it was
released. See Norway: Halt to COVID-19 Contact Tracing App a Major Win for Privacy, AMNESTY
INT’L (June 15, 2020, 01:05 UTC), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/norwaycovid19-contact-tracing-app-privacy-win [https://perma.cc/8UCN-NMEZ].
58 Bahrain, supra note 57.
59 Thomas Walle, Marketers Need to Know the Truth About GPS, ST. FIGHT (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://streetfightmag.com/2018/09/04/marketers-need-to-know-the-truth-about-gps/?utm_
content=76675208&utm_medium=social&utm_source=linkedin#.X6Z_7Wj0k2w
[https://
perma.cc/J9HB-3F64].
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definitions for exposure.”60 Nevertheless, such tools could be used to
support traditional contact tracing efforts, for instance assisting with
identification of outbreak hotspots and memory recall of an
individual.61 When deployed for these goals, contact tracing apps, such
as Rhode Island’s “Crush COVID RI,” do not require widespread
adoption in order to be effective.62 However, apps that utilize locationbased approaches also bring many more surveillance risks, issues with
public trust, and challenges in fully anonymizing data,63 as location
data is very sensitive and difficult to truly anonymize.64
2.

Centralized Bluetooth-Based Apps

Bluetooth technology is associated with fewer privacy risks than
GPS and may also provide more accurate proximity data due to its
increased precision (albeit at shorter range), though some have argued
to the contrary.65 Bluetooth does require a bit of lag time for phones to
sync to share information with those nearby.66 Additionally, the
technology also struggles to determine whether a device is one or ten
meters away from another device67—a crucial distinction for contact

60 JUSTIN CHAN ET AL., PACT: PRIVACY-SENSITIVE PROTOCOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR
MOBILE CONTACT TRACING 13 (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03544.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6EAP-UUUG].
61 ECDC, MOBILE APPLICATIONS, supra note 3.
62 Ferretti, supra note 2; Digital Contact Tracing, supra note 4; see also Crush COVID RI,
supra note 41.
63 Bahrain, supra note 57; see also Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., On the PrivacyConscientious Use of Mobile Phone Data, SCI. DATA, Dec. 11, 2018, at 1, https://www.nature.com/
articles/sdata2018286.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4W3-Q4VJ].
64 Luc Rocher, Julien M. Hendrickx & Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Estimating the Success
of Re-identifications in Incomplete Datasets Using Generative Models, NATURE COMMC’NS, July
23, 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-10933-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX45ELZ9].
65 JOHNS HOPKINS PROJECT, supra note 52.
66 DOUGLAS J. LEITH & STEPHEN FARRELL, CORONAVIRUS CONTACT TRACING: EVALUATING
THE POTENTIAL OF USING BLUETOOTH RECEIVED SIGNAL STRENGTH FOR PROXIMITY DETECTION
(2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.06822.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LQD-PA8B]; see also Casey
Newton, Why Bluetooth Apps Are Bad at Discovering New Cases of COVID-19, VERGE (Apr. 10,
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/4/10/21215267/covid-19-contacttracing-apps-bluetooth-coronavirus-flaws-public-health [https://perma.cc/K2QD-4KFA].
67 Sam Biddle, The Inventors of Bluetooth Say There Could Be Problems Using Their Tech for
Coronavirus Contact Tracing, INTERCEPT (May 5, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/
05/05/coronavirus-bluetooth-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/3JSC-6GSZ].
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tracing, where the former may be categorized as an epidemiological
contact and the latter would not.68
The inherent measurement error of Bluetooth technology can
potentially deliver a number of false positive proximity events,
whereby the app notifies a user that they may have been exposed in a
proximity event when they actually have not been exposed.69 Besides
leading to unnecessary anxiety and interference with a person’s life,
false positives also strain testing capacity70 and may lead to
notification fatigue, causing individuals to lose faith in the efficacy of
the system and stop acting on its recommendations.71 There are also
concerns of false negatives, which are exceptionally worrisome as it
equates to Bluetooth devices being unable to sync and thus failing to
identify a true exposure at scale.72
Several countries, including Singapore, Australia, France, and the
United Kingdom, have utilized centralized Bluetooth-based apps. The
U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS) app,73 which launched in May
2020,74 required individuals who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 to
upload both their personal phone ID code and the phone IDs of recent
contacts to a central server. The NHS app allows individuals to upload
their own randomized anonymized ID to a central database. Then, the
app routinely checks for “matches” with other persons who have tested

68 Majumder & Desai, supra note 6; see also LEITH & FARRELL, supra note 66; Newton, supra
note 66.
69 LEITH & FARRELL, supra note 66, at 9−10.
70 See Andy Crocker, Kurt Opsahl & Bennett Cyphers, The Challenge of Proximity Apps for
COVID-19 Contact Tracing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2020/04/challenge-proximity-apps-covid-19-contact-tracing
[https://perma.cc/EES4QPNS].
71 Natasha Lomas, NHS COVID-19: The UK’s Coronavirus Contacts-Tracing App Explained,
TECHCRUNCH (May 5, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/05/nhs-covid-19-the-ukscoronavirus-contacts-tracing-app-explained [https://perma.cc/5Z4G-UMM7].
72 Cristina Menni et al., Real-Time Tracking of Self-Reported Symptoms to Predict Potential
COVID-19, 26 NATURE MED. 1037, 1038–39 (2020); see also Thorin Klosowski, COVID Contact
Tracing Apps Are Far from Perfect, N.Y. TIMES: WIRECUTTER (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/covid-contact-tracing-apps
[https://perma.cc/ZD966ETY].
73 NHS App, NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/using-the-nhs/nhs-services/the-nhs-app [https://
perma.cc/A65M-T822].
74 Simon Murphy, Dan Sabbagh & Alex Hern, Piloted in May, Ditched in June: The Failure of
England’s COVID-19 App, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2020, 15:05 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2020/jun/18/piloted-in-may-ditched-in-june-the-failure-of-englands-covid-19-app
[https://perma.cc/N3FK-JBV4].
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positive and were previously in their vicinity.75 Although these IDs are
“anonymized,” officials are still able to view the entire network of
contacts.76 The centralized design allows health officials and
researchers to check whether the appropriate individuals are receiving
notifications.77 They can view all smartphones that receive an alert and
whether those users later reported symptoms or a positive test through
the app.78 This additional context can improve calculations about the
accuracy of alert notifications, and enable PHAs to suppress
notifications in “edge-cases,” when risk of inferential re-identification
is high.79
Ultimately, the U.K. government abandoned the NHS app for a
decentralized model once the technical and interoperability limitations
of the centralized model became evident.80 During testing, the NHS
app logged only one out of twenty-five contacts between people when
it was used on iPhones.81 The French and Australian apps also have
similar accuracy challenges, resulting in 460,000 of the nearly two
million individuals who installed France’s app to uninstall the app
soon after downloading it.82 In general, centralized Bluetooth-based
apps struggle to recognize each other, and privacy protections baked
75

Id.
Servick, supra note 35.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See Ian Levy, The Security Behind the NHS Contact Tracing App, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR.
(May 4, 2020), https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/security-behind-nhs-contact-tracing-app
[https://perma.cc/XF2K-SLAP] (providing an example of an “edge-case”: “[T]hink about an
elderly couple who are shielding and so don’t go out. They only see one other person who visits
them a few times a week. If one of their apps notifies them they’ve been in contact with someone
who’s symptomatic, it’s obviously their only visitor. It’s a policy decision whether you suppress
that notification or not, but the system has to be able to manage these sorts of things technically in
whatever model is used.”).
80 Murphy et al., supra note 74; see also Charlotte Jee, The UK Is Abandoning Its Current
Contact Tracing App for Google and Apple’s System, MIT TECH. REV. (June 18, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/18/1004097/the-uk-is-abandoning-its-currentcontact-tracing-app-for-google-and-apples-system [https://perma.cc/D2VV-DNEF].
81 James Cook, NHS Covid-19 App: How Does Track and Trace Work, and What Does the
‘Possible Exposure’ Message Mean?, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:51 AM), https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/07/15/track-trace-app-uk-google-apple-when-download
[https://perma.cc/8F6J-NMPP].
82 Romain Dillet, French Contact-Tracing App StopCovid Has Been Activated 1.8 Million
Times but Only Sent 14 Notifications, TECHCRUNCH (June 23, 2020, 6:11 AM), https://
techcrunch.com/2020/06/23/french-contact-tracing-app-stopcovid-has-been-activated-1-8million-times-but-only-sent-14-notifications [https://perma.cc/3JEE-8SAX].
76
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into operating systems may prevent Bluetooth from continually
sending out signals or passively scanning in the background.83
Additionally, requiring individuals to always have Bluetooth enabled
on their mobile devices, as well as having their devices remain
constantly unlocked and apps open, is not only a major inconvenience
and battery drain,84 but also increases the risk of malicious actors
hacking into user mobile devices for other criminal means.85
3.

Decentralized Bluetooth-Based Apps

Decentralized Bluetooth-based apps that utilize the GAEN API
do not suffer from the same technical limitations. Many countries,
including Belgium, Estonia, Finland, and Switzerland, have opted for
the decentralized approach where the data related to a cellphone’s
recent interactions are isolated to only that device.86 This prevents the
government, or any other centralized entity such as Apple or Google,
from collecting a user’s proximity information—greatly reducing
privacy and data security risks. Preliminary adoption evidence from
the Swiss app demonstrates a proof-of-principle that digital contact
tracing could be an effective complementary tool for reducing the
spread of COVID-19.87
Over the past few months, privacy-minded research groups have
led the charge for developing more widely-accepted protocols,
including the DP-3T88 and Private Automated Contact Tracing
83 Jules Polonetsky, FPF CEO: Will I Install an Exposure Notification App? Thoughts on the
Apple-Google API, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/05/20/fpf-ceo-will-iinstall-an-exposure-notification-app-thoughts-on-the-apple-google-api
[https://perma.cc/83JYUZLF] (explaining that privacy protections prevent misuse by governments, stalkers, criminals,
and marketers, but also undermine contact tracing functionality).
84 See, e.g., Chevaugn Powell, Is Your iPhone Battery Draining Fast? Here’s a Simple Fix,
TECHNOBEZZ (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.technobezz.com/iphone-battery-drains-fast
[https://perma.cc/YV86-JC4Y].
85 See Editorial, COVID-19 Digital Apps Need Due Diligence, 580 NATURE 563, 563 (2020),
https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-01264-1/d41586-020-01264-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LSK-L9KX].
86 O’Neill et al., supra note 54 (explaining that in decentralized tracing, matching is performed
on each user’s device, rather than matching user ID’s in a centralized location).
87 See generally Marcel Salathé et al., Early Evidence of Effectiveness of Digital Contact
Tracing for SARS-CoV-2 in Switzerland, SWISS MED. WKLY. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://smw.ch/article/doi/smw.2020.20457 [https://perma.cc/DM5S-PMY7].
88 TRONCOSO ET AL., supra note 22.
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(PACT).89 Privacy advocates have also encouraged decentralized
approaches for contact tracing apps, arguing that the decentralized
approaches leave data related to users’ social networks less vulnerable
to hacking or exploitation.90 The European Parliament has also
explicitly favored the decentralized approach.91 Unfortunately, the
United States continues to lag in national efforts to implement an
appropriate digital contact tracing network and is relying on each state
to develop apps that must be epidemiologically relevant for
nationwide, and even potentially global, contact tracing while
maintaining privacy and security standards.92
C.

Are Apps Even Necessary?

As established, the concept of digital contact tracing is similar to
that of traditional methods,93 where individuals are asked to
voluntarily self-isolate and monitor for symptoms based on their
previous proximity to an infected person—the key difference now
being the potential use of mobile devices and wearable technology to
identify exposure events, and in some cases, to enable latent tracking
of an individual’s actual location and movements.94 It is important to
stress that contact tracing and exposure notification apps should be
considered only as a supplement to other traditional and ongoing
89

CHAN ET AL., supra note 60.
See Tim Starks, Early Covid-19 Tracking Apps Easy Prey for Hackers, and It Might Get
Worse Before It Gets Better, POLITICO (July 6, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2020/07/06/coronavirus-tracking-app-hacking-348601
[https://perma.cc/L4VL-PSHQ].
Additionally, various types of attacks are also possible by malicious actors to create a false surge
in exposure notifications. At best, this could create undue anxiety and undermine the integrity of
the data. At worst, this could theoretically enable a hostile foreign government to dissuade voters
from turning out to vote, thus undermining the integrity of a political election.
91 Resolution on EU Coordinated Action to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic and Its
Consequences, EUR. PARL. DOC. P9_TA(2020)0054 (2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0054_EN.html [https://perma.cc/FX87-9M6W].
92 In a nationwide pandemic, the government could also utilize other means to nationally collect
and process contact tracing information, such as through the emergency powers outlined in the
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689 (1988)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121−5208). Those emergency powers could entitle the
Federal Emergency Management Agency to fund public assistance programs at the federal level,
but as of this writing any emergency funding for contact tracing is distributed to state, local, tribal,
and territorial entities.
93 CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING, supra note 1.
94 Ferretti et al., supra note 2.
90
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public health response efforts. Placing too much significance and trust
in location or proximity data as a panacea capable of stopping the
spread of the disease is not only naive, but also creates a false sense of
security for the general public.
Furthermore, aiming for tech exceptionalism and individualism
in the context of contact tracing and exposure notification apps
decreases their effectiveness and increases privacy risks. The creation
of digital contact tracing and exposure notification tools should be
viewed as a complement to improving diagnostic, screening, and
surveillance testing initiatives. Additionally, contact tracing
technologies should encourage ongoing relationships between the
public and PHAs.95 Digital contact tracing apps and exposure
notification tools would be of most use when incorporated in an
ecosystem that involves the expansion of local, community workers to
collect contact tracing data in confidence.96
Effective digital contact tracing necessitates credible and
equitable public health response. Ongoing discussions on success of
contact tracing apps have been primarily concerned with adoption97—
not the actual fidelity of the tracing and notification systems. While
decentralized Bluetooth-based designs are the primary choice for
digital tools, technological limitations with proximity data mean that
manual review will still be necessary.98 To date, there is still no
nationwide contact tracing app, leaving state and local authorities in
charge of contact tracing whether in-person or via digital means.
Neither the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
nor the CDC—nor any other U.S. federal agency—appears interested
in deploying a nationwide contact tracing app, burdening states with

95

See CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING, supra note 1.
See id.
97 Alejandro de la Garza, Contact Tracing Apps Were Big Tech’s Best Idea for Fighting
COVID-19. Why Haven’t They Helped?, TIME (Nov. 10, 2020 7:00 AM), https://time.com/
5905772/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps [https://perma.cc/R83Q-Q5YY]; see also Sarah Kreps,
Baobao Zhang & Nina McMurry, Contact-Tracing Apps Face Serious Adoption Obstacles,
BROOKINGS INST. (May 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/contact-tracing-appsface-serious-adoption-obstacles [https://perma.cc/QQW3-3APE].
98 Bluetooth technology could pose a problem for people on airplanes (close proximity) or if
people leave their phones when they go to various venues. Furthermore, digital tools are limited in
that they only discern distance and time and do not account for PPE or potential barriers, like people
in cars.
96
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not only the responsibility of developing an app but also regulating
it.99
The inability to have a one-size-fits-all solution should not stop
the development of a national network that uses experts from relevant
sectors to create a balanced contact tracing initiative. This requires that
public health authorities and digital surveillance tool developers
consider the following: (1) regulating standards for universal usability
and accessibility, as well as incentivization, to promote adoption of
and engagement with apps; (2) practices that are feasible for
individuals with older mobile devices and non-smartphones; (3) stateversus federal-level issues regarding biometric privacy regulations,
interoperability of apps across state boundaries, and enforcement of
app usage in varying jurisdictions; and (4) security and privacy laws
and rulings regarding health information and collection of mobile
data.100
It is particularly important that epidemiological and public health
initiatives are equally integrated into a framework that involves
regulation of privacy protections101 for mobile surveillance including
transparency, adequately encrypted data management, limited scope
of purposes and temporal limitations for collected data, anonymity,
and informed consent.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

Current evidence that COVID-19 contact tracing and exposure
notification apps would help control the epidemic is limited102 and
fails to account for issues of public literacy, privacy rights and
regulations, and digital inequities. A popularly cited model originating
from a team at the University of Oxford was misreported as suggesting

99 Andy Greenberg, State-Based Contact Tracing Apps Could Be a Mess, WIRED (May 27,
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/covid-19-contact-tracing-app-fragmentation
[https://perma.cc/M6PF-Y5BC].
100 Majumder & Desai, supra note 6.
101 BENJAMIN BOUDREAUX ET AL., RAND CORP., STRENGTHENING PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN
COVID-19 MOBILE PHONE–ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS (2020), https://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RBA300/RBA365-1/RAND_RBA3651.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMR3-6DRL].
102 Digital Contact Tracing, supra note 4.
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that COVID-19 apps need to be used by at least 60%103 of the
population to control the current coronavirus outbreak.104 More
recently, Oxford researchers have published further research that
suggests digital contact tracing can help to control an epidemic at low
levels of app uptake.105 Other COVID-19 researchers also state that
adoption at lower levels would still have a positive effect on curbing
the spread.106 However, others have suggested that contact tracing
should occur at least at a 50% level to have a beneficial reduction in
community spread.107
Nevertheless, the 60% figure has been frequently misreported in
the United States,108 and has arguably impacted policy decisions
related to contact tracing apps, leading some experts to call for contact
tracing apps to be mandatory109 and for others to lose hope in the
technology.110 In reality, contact tracing apps are not a zero-sum
proposition, but rather one tool—once appropriately developed and
regulated—to supplement other response efforts to reduce the rate of
transmission.111 Recognizing this, the Massachusetts Institute of
103 Id. This is assuming that neither traditional contact tracing nor widespread social distancing
rules are implemented and persons over seventy remained in lockdown. It is also important to note
that contact tracing apps for different diseases are not necessarily going to have the same threshold
needed for effectiveness.
104 Id. The original Oxford study actually states, “[o]ur models show we can stop the epidemic
if approximately 60% of the population use the app, and even with lower numbers of app users, we
still estimate a reduction in the number of coronavirus cases and deaths.” Id (quoting Christophe
Fraser).
105 See generally MATTHEW ABUEG ET AL., MODELING THE COMBINED EFFECT OF DIGITAL
EXPOSURE NOTIFICATION AND NON-PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS ON THE COVID-19
EPIDEMIC IN WASHINGTON STATE (2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/
2020.08.29.20184135v1.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8NL-W3JJ].
106 See Servick, supra note 35; see also Patrick Howell O’Neill, Coronavirus Tracing Apps Can
Save Lives Even with Low Adoption Rates, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/02/1007947/coronavirus-contact-tracing-apps-savelives-low-15-percent-adoption-rates [https://perma.cc/G4DA-P5YC].
107 Alyssa Bilinski, Farzad Mostashari & Joshua A. Salomon, Modeling Contact Tracing
Strategies for COVID-19 in the Context of Relaxed Physical Distancing Measures, JAMA
NETWORK OPEN, Aug. 21, 2020, https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/
2769618 [https://perma.cc/AG7V-AHBB].
108 See, e.g., Sarah Kreps et al., supra note 97.
109 Jane Bambauer et al., It’s Time to Get Real About COVID Apps, MEDIUM (May 14, 2020),
https://medium.com/@DataVersusCovid/its-time-to-get-real-about-covid-apps-dd82e08895f2
[https://perma.cc/TGT9-GRE5].
110 Kreps et al., supra note 97.
111 Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy, Webinar: Ed Felten—
COVID-19, Technology, Privacy and Civil Liberties, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://
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Technology has clarified and reiterated that adoption at rates lower
than 60% may have an impact on controlling an outbreak.112
Regardless, without considering the social inequities and inequalities,
the efficacy and ease of success for such applications should still be
questioned.113 As researchers and app developers around the world
race to build and refine these digital tools, it is important to consider
issues needed to win public trust and therefore widespread adoption of
this measure.
A.

Usability Across Disparate Populations

Approximately 95% of the U.S. population owns a cellphone, but
only about 85% of individuals currently own a smartphone.114
Proactive measures must be taken to mitigate this inherent bias against
those less likely to own a smartphone or have internet access,
including individuals who have lower educational attainment, lower
income earnings, are of a racial minority population, live in rural areas,
and/or are of senior age.115 Concentrating on a population that
potentially biases against these individuals means that usage of these
apps would also be biasing against persons who are more likely to be
without adequate healthcare access and/or are vulnerable to poorer

www.youtube.com/watch?v=miOgq5Q5EC0 [https://perma.cc/V5BA-LR44] (stating that there
have been a range of claims about effectiveness of contact tracing apps, but instead these apps
should be thought of as part of a much broader spectrum of approaches to reduce the rate of
transmission; they are not a “silver-bullet solution”).
112 Patrick Howell O’Neill, No, Coronavirus Apps Don’t Need 60% Adoption to Be Effective,
MIT TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covidapps-effective-at-less-than-60-percent-download [https://perma.cc/R63B-LHGL].
113 Servick, supra note 35.
114 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/
fact-sheet/mobile/#:~:text=mobile%20revolution%20below.-,Mobile%20phone%20ownership%
20over%20time,smartphone%20ownership%20conducted%20in%202011
[https://perma.cc/
3X6F-NKDD]; S. O’Dea, Smartphone Users in the United States 2018−2024, STATISTA (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182/forecast-of-smartphone-users-in-the-us
[https://perma.cc/X3RF-759J].
115 Amalia R. Miller & Catherine E. Tucker, Can Health Care Information Technology Save
Babies?, 119 J. POL. ECON. 289, 315 (2011) (noting that “technological innovation in health care
has often disproportionately benefited those with higher education and more resources” (citation
omitted)); see also Catherine Tucker & Shuyi Yu, Does IT Lead to More Equal Treatment? An
Empirical Study of the Effect of Smartphone Use on Customer Complaint Resolution 21 (Mktg. Sci.
Inst., Working Paper No. 18-111, 2018), https://www.msi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/MSI_
Report_18-111-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5W8-W9PB].
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health outcomes116—a contradictory proposal for an initiative
concerned with public health. In this light, special attention should
accentuate: (1) how any apps will reflect data from marginalized
communities; and (2) should the app indicate infection clusters, the
potential impact of labeling such communities as hotspots. Minority
communities have experienced higher rates of SARS-CoV-2
infections and COVID-19 cases as a result of systemic issues,117 and
there must be assurances that exposure and tracing data will not be
used to further marginalize these communities.
Additional resources to respond to COVID-19 should also be
distributed to areas most affected by lack of smartphone access to
mitigate these inequalities. Various approaches have already been
suggested to increase participation among this demographic. For
example, the federal government could distribute wearable tracking
beacons for individuals to wear—an approach that is being considered
in a number of U.S. schools to overcome smartphone ownership
gaps.118 This would be similar to Singapore, where the government has
initiated distribution of “TraceTogether Tokens,” wearable tracking
devices, to individuals who do not own smartphones (including
migrant workers) and those who would prefer to not download an app
onto their mobile device.119 However, this would entail the
development of additional security and privacy extensions of current
laws to apply to wearable devices.120 Furthermore, even with these

116 Nicol Turner Lee & Jordan Roberts, Managing Health Privacy and Bias in COVID-19 Public
Surveillance, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/
04/21/managing-health-privacy-and-bias-in-covid-19-public-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/
5VWN-98QD].
117 John Eligon et al., Black Americans Face Alarming Rates of Coronavirus Infection in Some
States, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/coronavirus-race.html
[https://perma.cc/M78R-XR6M].
118 Will Knight, Schools Turn to Surveillance Tech to Prevent COVID-19 Spread, WIRED (June
5, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/schools-surveillance-tech-prevent-covid-19spread [https://perma.cc/TTQ2-SVE2].
119 Saira Asher, TraceTogether: Singapore Turns to Wearable Contact-Tracing Covid Tech,
BBC NEWS (July 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53146360 [https://perma.cc/
MQX9-8HGB].
120 According to University College London expert Michael Veale, these wearables present
“accountability and privacy concerns.” John Geddie & Aradhana Aravindan, Singapore Plans
Wearable Virus-Tracing Device for All, REUTERS (June 5, 2020, 12:37 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-singapore-tech/singapore-plans-wearable-virustracing-device-for-all-idUSKBN23C0FO [https://perma.cc/99K5-FHYB]; see also Justin Evans &
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interventions, the proliferation of uneven broadband access across the
United States undermines the effectiveness of digital contact tracing
and exposure notification tools, particularly in under-privileged and
rural areas.121
Any contact tracing and exposure notification app and digital tool
that comes to the market needs to be able to work on a variety of
devices, especially allowing for interoperability between devices that
use different operating systems. Such apps developed with Google and
Apple’s API will work most effectively on Apple and Android
devices, which account for three billion smartphones around the
world.122 However, many smartphones utilize other operating systems,
or even older operating systems, considering that most smartphones
appear to last approximately two and a half to three years.123
Furthermore, consideration should be allocated to feature phones, not
just smartphones, that use operating systems that would be
incompatible with these newly developed apps.
B.

Regulation of Literacy and Disability Compatibility

App design is crucial for contact tracing and exposure notification
apps to truly be considered a universal proposition. This entails
requiring the integration of usable, accessible, and universal design
concepts for any app that is available on the market.124 In order to best
meet accessibility principles, apps must have a usable design that
meets the International Organization of Standardization’s (ISO) codes

Katelyn Ringrose, From Fitbits to Pacemakers: Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security in the
Healthtech Age, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. ET CETERA 1, 7−8 (2019).
121 This issue undermined North Dakota’s “Care19” app. See Erin Brodwin, An App for Football
Fans Became a Digital Contact Tracing Tool—and Could Be a Litmus Test for Covid-19
Technology, STAT (June 24, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/24/digital-contact-tracingnorth-dakota [https://perma.cc/6J37-PQW5].
122 Mark Gurman, Apple, Google Bring Covid-19 Contact-Tracing to 3 Billion People,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-10/
apple-google-bring-covid-19-contact-tracing-to-3-billion-people [https://perma.cc/4K2H-727A].
123 S. O’Dea, Replacement Cycle Length of Smartphones in the United States 2014−2024, in
Years, STATISTA (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/619788/average-smartphonelife [https://perma.cc/Y76J-6A2Z].
124 What Is the Difference Between Accessible, Usable, and Universal Design?, DO-IT CTR.
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.washington.edu/doit/what-difference-between-accessible-usableand-universal-design [https://perma.cc/N579-4264].
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for usability.125 This means that efficiency, efficacy, and satisfaction
should drive important features of usability including: (1) maintaining
software equality and compatibility;126 (2) developing the app with a
human-centric approach; (3) meeting usability testing and assurance
standards; and (4) designing a user interface that drives engagement
across all people.127 User interface design is particularly complex, and
if the ISO’s guidelines prove too restrictive for app developers, HHS
has established a set of interactive user interface guidelines that
provide a similar level of considerations for usability while allowing
more flexibility for users.128
In general, many apps lack accessible design and are poorly
adapted for use by disabled people.129 Approximately 26% of the U.S.
population, and about 15% of the global population, lives with some
disability.130 Apple’s iOS has special “Accessibility” features for
apps,131 but these features may only enhance user experience and
engagement if the user interface is designed to maintain a simple
structure and includes easy to read text at an accessible literacy
level.132 This means that developers should consider limiting dynamic
125 See generally Nigel Bevan et al., New ISO Standards for Usability, Usability Reports and
Usability Measures, in HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION: THEORY, DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND
PRACTICE 268 (Masaaki Kurosu ed., 2016) (explaining the ISO’s codes for usability and how they
can be used).
126 See discussion supra Section II.A.
127 See Bevan et al., supra note 125.
128 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RESEARCH-BASED WEB DESIGN & USABILITY
GUIDELINES (2006), https://www.usability.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidelines_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZT4-EAEX]; KELSEY FINCH ET AL., MIT COMPUTATIONAL L. REP., DIGITAL
CONTACT TRACING: A PLAYBOOK FOR RESPONSIBLE DATA USE 14 (2020), https://law.mit.edu/
pub/digitalcontacttracingaplaybookforresponsibledatause/release/1
[https://perma.cc/8C6X98VB]; see also Bevan et al., supra note 125.
129 The authors follow the terminology of disabled people in this Article to emphasize the view
that persons are disabled by a society that has not effectively adapted and equipped itself to allow
all persons to engage equally. The authors do acknowledge the importance of person-first speech
as well and additionally support the phrasing of persons with disabilities.
130 WORLD HEALTH ORG. & THE WORLD BANK, WORLD REPORT ON DISABILITY 7 (2011),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/70670/WHO_NMH_VIP_11.01_eng.pdf;
jsessionid=94D6F1DF2FEDE17B8327C2BB344720AF?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/F8ZBMUF4]; Disability Impacts All of Us, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-all.html#:~:text=
61%20million%20adults%20in%20the,is%20highest%20in%20the%20South [https://perma.cc/
FXS9-AELM]; see also FINCH ET AL., supra note 128.
131 Accessibility, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/accessibility [https://perma.cc/F2C6-DUAJ].
132 MARKO PERIŠA, IVAN CVITIĆ & ROSANA ELIZABETA SENTE, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
MOBILE PHONE APPLICATION SOLUTIONS ACCESSIBILITY FOR INFORMING VISUALLY IMPAIRED
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and animated aspects in apps while also using large buttons on static
screens.133 In terms of the text itself, typeface should be of a basic
structure and large size to account for those who have various issues
with vision.134 Additionally, contrast ratios and color contrasts are
important design aspects that need to be standardized.135
Furthermore, the content of the material presented in the app
should conform to average literacy capabilities in the United States
and provide accurate translations for major non-English languages.
Approximately only four in five U.S. adults have English literacy
skills to complete low-level inferences, and those who are traditionally
non-English speakers are at lower literacy levels overall.136 Given the
disproportionate rates of COVID-19 in communities of color, and
communities where English may not be the first or only language
spoken in the home,137 developers should be cognizant of the ways in
which their apps can support or hamper the health of users from a
design standpoint.
Developers should aim to implement universal design in their
contact tracing and exposure notification apps. In this way, the design
of the app is such that all people can use the app, to the greatest extent
possible, without needing to implement additional parameters for
adaptation.138 Not only are these products designed to minimize or
eliminate the addition of extra assistive technologies but are also easily
compatible with common assistive technologies and hardware should
they be needed.139 Following rules outlined in the Americans with
Disabilities Act,140 and fostering compliance enforced by FCC and

PERSONS IN TRAFFIC ENVIRONMENT (2016), https://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/875278.s02p10_002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJT5-289L]; see also Alice Crook et al., Perspectives of a Mobile Application for
People with Communication Disabilities in the Community, 12 DISABILITY & REHAB.: ASSISTIVE
TECH. 184 (2017).
133 See PERIŠA ET AL., supra note 132; Crook et al., supra note 132.
134 See PERIŠA ET AL., supra note 132; Crook et al., supra note 132.
135 See PERIŠA ET AL., supra note 132; Crook et al., supra note 132.
136 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Adult Literacy in the United States, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS.: NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATS. (July 2019), https://nces.ed.gov/datapoints/2019179.asp [https://perma.cc/
U5B9-P5SB].
137 Miller & Tucker, supra note 115; see Eligon et al., supra note 117.
138 What Is the Difference Between Accessible, Usable, and Universal Design?, supra note 124.
139 Id.
140 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
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HHS would help to ensure that developers are truly attempting
universal design in their contact tracing and exposure notification apps
before releasing those apps to the market.
C.

Adoption Incentivization

Perhaps the largest obstacle to tackle is the inevitably limited
scope and scale of the data collected by contact tracing apps. First, if
privacy issues dictate that contact tracing apps must allow for user optin, how efficient and effective will these apps even be for
epidemiological purposes? A recent survey suggests that over 60% of
the U.S. population would likely install a contract tracing app on their
smartphones.141 However, researchers have shown that adoption of
new health behaviors relies on a complex relationship of
psychological, sociological, and cultural factors at the individual
level.142 Furthermore, it is a difficult undertaking to convince such a
majority of the country to: (1) trust in the privacy and security
standards implemented; (2) believe in the efficacy of the apps; and (3)
actively use the app.143 By making exposure notification functionality
available at the operating system level of Apple and Android devices,
the Exposure Notification Express tackles these obstacles head-on for
at least exposure notification–based tools.
In the context of centralized apps, there is the potential—albeit of
low likelihood144—that governments not only use contact tracing apps
for disease surveillance, but also use the location or proximity data to
enforce travel restrictions and quarantine orders, including validation
of fines and potential criminal charges.145 Privacy advocates continue
141 Luke Milsom et al., Survey of Acceptability of App-Based Contact Tracing in the UK, US,
France, Germany and Italy, OSF (July 21, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://osf.io/7vgq9 [https://perma.cc/
X7WK-8FCA].
142 See generally Michael P. Kelly & Mary Barker, Why Is Changing Health-Related Behaviour
So Difficult?, 136 PUB. HEALTH 109 (2016).
143 See Brooke Auxier, How Americans See Digital Privacy Issues amid the COVID-19
Outbreak, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/
how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/9GVH2R7K].
144 A more likely scenario would be mandated use at the level of local entities, such as schools,
colleges, workplaces, etc.
145 See Samantha Raphelson, Kentucky Man Accused of Breaking Canada’s COVID-19 Rules
Faces $569,000 Fine, NPR (Aug. 25, 2020, 2:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/25/
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to warn of “mission creep”146 and that government access to such
health information could be used in discriminatory manners, such as
the development of “immunity passports” that would allow only those
who have not tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 to be able to travel.147
Additionally, the mandatory use of an app for monitoring locations in
the context of quarantine enforcement is challengeable under the
United States v. Jones test.148 If the government instead focused on a
binary solution for quarantine compliance,149 this would perhaps be a

905847150/american-man-accused-of-breaking-canadas-covid-19-rules-faces-560-000-fine
[https://perma.cc/Z6TU-NFJE]. Quarantine enforcement apps have also been deployed
internationally. For instance, in Poland, a quarantine compliance app was implemented which aims
to prevent individuals from breaching quarantine by requiring them to self-upload geolocated
photos of their face within twenty minutes of receiving a request. See Home Quarantine, APPLE:
APP STORE PREVIEW, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/home-quarantine/id1502997499 [https://
perma.cc/LRD6-JJ3A]. App users are also obliged to immediately notify relevant health
departments if they develop any symptoms. See id.; see also Mark Scott & Zosia Wanat, Poland’s
Coronavirus App Offers Playbook for Other Governments, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2020, 6:30 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-coronavirus-app-offers-playbook-for-other-governments
[https://perma.cc/HY6J-WCSY].
146 Matthew Guariglia, The Dangers of COVID-19 Surveillance Proposals to the Future of
Protest, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/somecovid-19-surveillance-proposals-could-harm-free-speech-after-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/PN7YJUSH]. “Mission creep” or “surveillance creep” could involve the use of biometric data in a healthrelated app being used by law enforcement authorities, employment organizations, and private
companies. Such concerns were recently voiced in the U.K. regarding Palantir’s partnership with
NHS, and Palantir responded that only NHS would retain the aggregated data. Palantir Tech.,
Response to Privacy International Open Letter Dated 29 April 2020, PRIV. INT’L, https://
privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/Response%20to%20Privacy%
20International%20Open%20Letter%20dated%2029%20April%202020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
M5CQ-NJH8].
147 Mark A. Hall & David M. Studdert, Privileges and Immunity Certification During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 323 JAMA 2243, 2243−44 (2020). Members of Congress have proposed
legislation to bar discriminatory uses of contact tracing apps. See Public Health Emergency Privacy
Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. § 3(c) (2020) (introduced by Senators Blumenthal and Warner on May
14, 2020); Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. § 8 (2020) (introduced by
Senators Cantwell and Cassidy on June 1, 2020).
148 Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, LAWFARE (Apr. 7,
2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-and-fourth-amendment
[https://perma.cc/M9A7-AHPY] (arguing that “if the government were to track people’s movement
by directly surveilling cellphones . . . that might violate a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404−08 (2012) (holding that when the
police commit a common law trespass to obtain information, they have committed a Fourth
Amendment search).
149 In this context, a binary solution refers to the mere confirmation of whether or not an
individual has violated a quarantine order without continued location surveillance. See
Rozenshtein, supra note 148; see also Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v.
Caballes: How to Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 413–14 (2005);
Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139 (2014).
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feasible solution without breaking the law,150 but this focus on privacy
of information fails to consider a person’s right to privacy of place.151
If individuals feel coerced into adoption, this could undermine
trust in public health authorities and other strategies used to mitigate
COVID-19. Additionally, mass acceptance of voluntary contact
tracing and exposure notification apps may require that individuals
believe in the call to action for society as a reason for adopting such
public health behaviors.152 With nearly 40% of COVID-19 infections
being asymptomatic,153 the current acceptance level of public health
behaviors,154 the proliferation of misinformation,155 and the
politicization of scientific and health information,156 a voluntary effort
is unlikely to achieve sufficient scale for properly tracking the spread
of the virus. This is especially true without the implementation of a
comprehensive nationwide strategy to: communicate the individual
and societal benefits; provide monetary and non-monetary incentives;
and provide additional assurances that the privacy and fundamental
rights of individuals and groups will be protected. For instance, only
roughly 4% of Virginia’s population downloaded their contact tracing
app in the first week of release,157 with the anticipation that only a

150 Simmons, supra note 149 (discussing the constitutional validity of the binary search
doctrine); Rozenshtein, supra note 148.
151 Sacharoff, supra note 149; see also Zack Whittaker, Fearing Coronavirus, a Michigan
College Is Tracking Its Students with a Flawed App, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 19, 2020, 4:30 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/19/coronavirus-albion-security-flaws-app
[https://perma.cc/
DJ4U-SLTT] (demonstrating how the mandatory use of app for monitoring locations in the context
of quarantine enforcement fails to consider a person’s right to privacy of place); Zeynep Tufekci,
The Pandemic Is No Excuse to Surveil Students, ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2020), https://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/09/pandemic-no-excuse-colleges-surveil-students/
616015 [https://perma.cc/67WE-TDWY].
152 Cf. Katherine White & Bonnie Simpson, When Do (and Don’t) Normative Appeals Influence
Sustainable Consumer Behaviors?, 77 J. MKTG. 78, 78 (2013) (exploring how injunctive appeals,
descriptive appeals, and benefit appeals “can encourage consumers to engage in relatively
unfamiliar sustainable behaviors”).
153 COVID-19 Pandemic Planning Scenarios, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planning-scenarios.html
[https://perma.cc/68UW-EDVT].
154 See generally Stephan Van den Broucke, Why Health Promotion Matters to the COVID-19
Pandemic, and Vice Versa, 35 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 181 (2020).
155 See generally BOUKOUVALAS ET AL., supra note 17.
156 See generally id.
157 Dave, supra note 43. The 4% calculation is based on the reported 316,000 downloads in the
Commonwealth of Virginia compared to the Commonwealth’s population of 8.536 million people
from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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portion of these users will actually use the app appropriately. This
contrasts with Ireland’s adoption rate of 37% and Germany’s adoption
rate of over 20%.158
Incentivization may be a useful option for promoting enough
adoption and use of contact tracing and exposure notification apps to
get to a sufficient level of engagement in the United States. To help
policymakers and public health experts “revise their messaging and
reverse the erosion of government trust,” another suggestion might be
to link participation with direct benefits,159 whereby participation is
potentially integrated with a wage replacement program set up for the
purpose of supporting those affected by COVID-19. Referencing
NFIB v. Sebelius,160 Congress could also establish, within a federal
framework, a tax incentive for contact tracing app usage—either
providing those who engage with the app a type of tax deduction or
creating a tax penalty for those who do not follow the mandate. In this
way, users would become more likely to opt in for use of contact
tracing and exposure notification apps, similar to the influx of
Americans who signed up for Affordable Care Act161 insurance
plans.162 This would create a type of mandatory requirement for usage
but still allow users to have the ability to choose to opt in or deal with
a monetary penalty. However, economic incentives such as these may
also be criticized as a form of economic coercion, with a greater
impact on under-privileged communities.

158 Charlotte Jee, Is a Successful Contact Tracing App Possible? These Countries Think So.,
MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/
covid-contract-tracing-app-germany-ireland-success [https://perma.cc/P37N-GVET].
159 Sarah Holder, Contact Tracing Is Having a Trust Crisis, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Aug. 12,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-12/why-are-americans-souneasy-about-contact-tracing?sref=aGTrSb9U&utm_content=citylab&utm_medium=
social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic [https://perma.cc/L2FR-3F58].
160 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
161 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
162 Annie Nova, How the Affordable Care Act Transformed Our Health-Care System, CNBC
(Dec. 29, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/29/how-the-affordable-care-acttransformed-the-us-health-care-system.html [https://perma.cc/4NGT-89ZE].
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III. HEALTH & BIOMETRIC PRIVACY
A.

Self-Reporting vs. Healthcare Provider-Reporting

Contact tracing and exposure notification apps often process
solely confirmed diagnoses for the purpose of initiating an exposure
notification, but they may also allow for individuals to self-report
symptoms.163 Before switching designs, the United Kingdom’s
centralized app allowed for self-reporting of symptoms to trigger an
exposure notification.164 The United Kingdom opted for this strategy
because the epidemiological model the United Kingdom was relying
on demonstrated that any delay in isolating symptomatic individuals
has a “real effect on the spread of the virus.”165 If testing is low or
slow, then apps designed to process only officially confirmed
diagnoses may leave more community spreaders undetected, thereby
increasing the occurrence of “false negatives.” On the other hand, selfreporting of symptoms can increase the occurrence of “false positives”
and over-notification. Malicious or accidental false reports may cause
unnecessary anxiety, notification fatigue, and ultimately cause users
to lose faith in the efficacy of the system and stop acting on its
recommendations.166 As previously mentioned, SARS-CoV-2 can be
transmitted before symptoms are apparent,167 rendering self-reporting
of symptoms itself too slow to control transmission and effectively
mooted by asymptomatic carriers.168

163 Ian Levy, The Security Behind the NHS Contact Tracing App, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR. (May
4,
2020),
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/security-behind-nhs-contact-tracing-app
[https://perma.cc/S8BM-ACZH]. Apps that rely on self-reporting of symptoms may enable faster
notification to others who are at risk of exposure. Id. (“The less delay there is, the better the NHS
can manage the spread [of SARS-CoV-2].”).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 LARS BAUMGÄRTNER ET AL., MIND THE GAP: SECURITY & PRIVACY RISKS OF CONTACT
TRACING APPS (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.05914.pdf [https://perma.cc/https://perma.cc/
N74P-DYF]. Allowing self-reporting could also lead to certain security attacks. Id. For instance,
an attacker could go to a busy place with a Raspberry Pi and an antenna, create fake proximity
events, and then self-report themselves as sick, causing everyone in the area to receive a
notification. Id.
167 Ferretti et al., supra note 2, at 1, 6.
168 Id. at 6.
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In the United States, federal legislation has been introduced that
would outlaw self-reporting for exposure notification and contact
tracing apps. The bipartisan Exposure Notification Privacy Act
(ENPA) would require apps to process only confirmed diagnoses that
trigger exposure notifications.169 This aligns with the Terms of Service
for GAEN tools.170 To implement this in practice, PHAs must deploy
a test verification server and a key server to validate positive diagnoses
during a key upload (received from a test center or other healthcare
provider).171 Apple has outlined twelve steps involved with verifying
and submitting positive diagnoses with Exposure Notification
Express.172
However, these twelve steps mean there are potentially multiple
points of failure by PHAs, health care providers, test centers,
individuals, and the system. First, a user with the functionality enabled
on their device must get tested for COVID-19. Then, the health care
provider or test center determines that the user is positive for SARSCoV-2 and reports it to the PHA. The PHA then must generate a
verification code using the test verification server. This code must be
sent to the user, who must enter the code or click the provided link to
inform their device of the positive diagnosis. The device subsequently
contacts the test verification server to validate the verification code. If
valid, a long-term authentication token is sent from the test
verification server. The device then creates a hashed message
authentication code and sends it to the test verification server along
with the authentication token. In return, it receives a certificate and
metadata. Next, the device prompts the user for permission to submit
their keys to the key server. If the individual grants permission, the
data is uploaded to the key server. Finally, if validated by the server,

169

See Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861 § 3(b) 116th Cong. (2020).
See Google COVID-19 Exposure Notifications Service Additional Terms, GOOGLE (May 4,
2020), https://blog.google/documents/72/Exposure_Notifications_Service_Additional_Terms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37FA-AQPH] [hereinafter GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Additional Terms];
see also Apple & Google, supra note 54.
171 Setting Up an Exposure Notifications Express Test Verification Server, supra note 30; see
also Exposure Notifications Verification Server, GOOGLE API FOR EXPOSURE NOTIFICATIONS,
https://developers.google.com/android/exposure-notifications/verification-system#flow-diagram
[https://perma.cc/WD48-AV2Q]; Exposure Notification Reference Key Server, GITHUB, https://
github.com/google/exposure-notifications-server [https://perma.cc/P6RU-AED4].
172 Supporting Exposure Notifications Express, supra note 29.
170
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the keys are added to the database and become available for other
devices to download to be used for on-device exposure detection.173
B.

Electronic Protected Health Information

Fundamentally, the information collected, stored, and shared via
contact tracing and exposure notification apps is associated with
health information, which suggests that such data may be under the
purview of the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA).174 That contact tracing and exposure notification data
may come within the purview of HIPAA protections is supported by
both Apple and Google stating that only PHAs can use their system.175
As the 2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act requires, businesses that assist healthcare
providers in the sharing of electronic protected health information (ePHI) (i.e., contact tracing and exposure notification apps), must be
compliant with the Privacy and Security Rules of HIPAA.176 Under
HIPAA, the privacy of e-PHI is not only protected, but also subject to
security regulations that protect the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability/sharing of e-PHI.177
Ultimately, the requirement of “self-reporting,” or rather opt-in,
for these apps nullifies HIPAA’s ability to protect user data and dictate
the protocols for transmitting, using, storing, and destroying this
data.178 However, many state-level laws supersede HIPAA’s
guidelines and create a complex labyrinth of regulatory and legislative
173

Id.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 262, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021–31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9); see also
Your Mobile Device and Health Information Privacy and Security, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://archive.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/your-mobile-device-and-health-informationprivacy-and-security [https://perma.cc/8AKS-CRCA].
175 GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Terms, supra note 21.
176 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, §§ 13401, 13404, 123 Stat. 226, 260, 264 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 17931, 17934); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2020). The HITECH Act was enacted as part
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
177 45 C.F.R. § 1644.504; see also Your Mobile Device and Health Information Privacy and
Security, supra note 174.
178 110 Stat. at 2029 (setting forth penalties for individuals who wrongfully disclose individually
identifiable health information).
174
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processes that could govern such information.179 Nevertheless, the
HHS and its associated agencies, specifically the CDC and National
Institutes of Health (NIH), should be involved in the regulatory
processes, particularly for the creation of a nationwide contact tracing
initiative, to ensure that health and medical information is adequately
protected and aggregated in a secure way that still allows for optimal
research efficacy.
The HHS previously lacked a transparent and standardized
framework for aggregating and sharing data between its agencies.180
Accordingly, each agency retained autonomy in interpreting data
sharing rules such that data at NIH could follow strict privacy
procedures while perhaps the CDC remained more lax.181 In March
2020, the HHS finalized two rules under the bipartisan 21st Century
Cures Act (Cures Act).182 The Cures Act aims to promote
interoperability of ePHI under the first rule, which requires that the
United States Core Data for Interoperability standard is used as part of
a new API certification criterion for apps.183
The second rule under the Cures Act prevents “information
blocking” practices, such as anti-competitive behaviors by developers
of e-PHI information security.184 This suggests that the inclusion of
the FTC and FCC is critical—the FCC would regulate the transmission
of electronic and digital communications, and the FTC would regulate
apps acting deceptively or in an unfair manner. Additionally, while the
FDA does not regulate devices in public health surveillance, they do
provide additional useful guidance on related mobile medical apps that

179 There are many states that have laws governing the confidentiality of state-held records,
including in California, Washington, and Montana. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.37 (West 2020);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.020 (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-525 (West 2020).
180 See THE DATA INITIATIVE TEAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE STATE OF
DATA SHARING AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 9 (2018), https://
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/HHS_StateofDataSharing_0915.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MKQDKBF].
181 See id.
182 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
183 See Cures Act Final Rule: United States Core Data for Interoperability, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/cures/sites/default/files/cures/2020-03/USCDI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3KS7-Q4GQ].
184 45 C.F.R. § 170.401 (2020).
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should be considered.185 Issues related to access to location data
collected by the HHS require additional scrutiny, particularly since
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule contains exceptions for disclosures to law
enforcement.186
C.

“Opt-In” and Non-federal Biometric Privacy Regulations

In contrast to HIPAA, some state laws dictate the protection and
transfer of personal data once a user has opted-in, notably Illinois’
Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA)187 and California’s
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).188 Other states have also passed
biometric privacy laws,189 or currently have proposed biometric
privacy laws pending,190 but BIPA particularly includes a private right
of action.191 BIPA also sets forth a comprehensive regulatory
framework that could be mirrored in federal regulation, restricting
how private entities collect, use, and share biometric information and
185 See generally U.S. FDA, POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE
MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/80958/download [https://perma.cc/C95L-7YNR]; see
also Digital Health Policies and Public Health Solutions for COVID-19: FDA’s Digital Health
Policies Allow Innovators to Create COVID-19 Related Public Health Solutions, U.S. FDA (Mar.
26, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical-devices/
digital-health-policies-and-public-health-solutions-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/FQ9Q-87AF].
186 See discussion infra Part IV; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2020); PANDURANGA ET AL.,
supra note 16.
187 Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 2008 Ill. Laws 994 (codified at 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/1−99 (2020)).
188 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA), 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55, § 3 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100−99 (West 2020)).
189 States with biometric privacy laws include Arkansas, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103(7) (West 2020); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1798.100−99; 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1−99; LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3073(4)(a)(v) (West 2020);
New York (N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-bb (McKinney 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602
(West 2020); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.375.020 (West 2020).
190 States with currently pending proposed biometric privacy laws include Arizona, Hawaii, and
Massachusetts. Other states that have attempted legislation that ultimately died in committee or
chamber include Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island. See 2020 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/2020-consumer-data-privacy-legislation637290470.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V5DK-GFVF]; H. 72, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017); H. 518, 65th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2017) (died in committee); H. 350, 149th Gen. Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. (Del. 2018).
191 740 ILL. COMP. STAT 14/20.
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biometric identifiers under specific security requirements.192
Biometric identifiers include “retina or iris scan[s], fingerprint[s],
voiceprint[s], or scan[s] of hand or face geometry.”193
On August 4, 2020, Senator Merkley and Senator Sanders
introduced the National Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2020 to
Congress.194 The proposal, similar to BIPA, contains a private right of
action and a requirement for businesses and employers to obtain the
“opt-in” consent of an individual prior to the collection or disclosure
of biometric identifiers.195 The bill also contains a right of access for
individuals to know what information a covered entity has collected
about them.196 The bill is supported by various consumer and privacy
rights organizations197 amid growing concerns that non-white
individuals are more likely to be misidentified by facial recognition
technology.198
The risk of inaccurate yet pervasive surveillance enabled through
facial recognition technology can have alarming consequences.199 In
this regard, it is striking that digital contact tracing and exposure
notification tools are similarly associated with accuracy concerns,
surveillance risks, and equity issues. As this Article discusses in Part
I, these concerns vary depending on how such apps are designed and

192

740 ILL. COMP. STAT 14/15.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT 14/10.
194 National Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2020, S. 4400, 116th Cong. (2020); Press
Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley, Merkley, Sanders Introduce Legislation to Put Strict Limits on
Corporate Use of Facial Recognition (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/merkley-sanders-introduce-legislation-to-put-strict-limits-on-corporate-use-of-facialrecognition-2020 [https://perma.cc/FF6W-BHA3].
195 S. 4400, §§ 3−4; Press Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley, supra note 194.
196 S. 4400, § 3(f); Press Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley, supra note 194.
197 “The bill is supported by Fight for the Future, The American Civil Liberties Union,
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Open Technology Institute.” Press Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley,
supra note 194.
198 NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software:
Demographics Study on Face Recognition Algorithms Could Help Improve Future Tools, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (May 18, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/
nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software
[https://perma.cc/THP3KMBC].
199 Elizabeth McClellan, Note & Comment, Facial Recognition Technology: Balancing the
Benefits and Concerns, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 363, 374−76 (2020); see also Kashmir Hill,
Unmasking a Company That Wants to Unmask Us All, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/reader-center/insider-clearview-ai.html [https://perma.cc/AR3NCN6W].
193
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implemented.200 Nevertheless, in alignment with BIPA, there is
widespread consensus in liberal democracies that contact tracing and
exposure notification apps ought to be “opt-in,” as demonstrated by
the fact that most contact tracing apps are not mandatory.201 Almost
all federal and state contact tracing proposals reflect this despite
significant divergences in other areas.202
However, in the context of contact tracing and exposure
notification apps, the issue of consent is more nuanced than a binary
choice between “opt-in” or “mandatory.” For instance, different app
functionalities203 should not be bundled together “so that the
individual can provide his/her consent specifically for each
functionality.”204 Individuals should be provided with granular choices
to choose their desired functionalities without being forced to opt in to
others, and be provided with the opportunity to provide additional
consent if an app is materially changed.205 Consent could be required
at each of the following points: (1) to download an app onto a device;
(2) to process the positive diagnosis of a user; and (3) to share personal
data with third parties.206 The E.U. Commission’s app guidance states
that under the ePrivacy Directive, “storing . . . information on the
user’s device or gaining access to” stored information is prohibited
unless the user provides consent.207

200

See discussion supra Part I.
Aside from a few outliers such as contact tracing apps from Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. See
Bahrain, supra note 57.
202 See, e.g., Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. § 3(d) (2020)
(introduced by Sen. Blumenthal); COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663,
116th Cong. § 3 (2020) (introduced by Sen. Wicker); Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861,
116th Cong. § 4 (introduced by Sen. Cantwell); Assemb. A10583C, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. § 2
(N.Y. 2020); see also State and Territorial Contact Tracing Legislation, ASS’N OF STATE &
TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS. (July 2, 2020), https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/State-andTerritorial-Contact-Tracing-Legislation [https://perma.cc/5PM5-LUUQ].
203 In this context, functionalities refers to, inter alia, proximity detection, location tracking,
symptom monitoring, COVID-19 research, digital telehealth management, COVID-19 information,
or quarantine monitoring and enforcement.
204 Guidance on Apps Supporting the Fight Against COVID 19 Pandemic in Relation to Data
Protection, 2020 (C 124 I/01).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. The ePrivacy Directive provides another exception for when access to the information “is
strictly necessary for [a] . . . service . . . explicitly requested . . . by the user.” Id.
201
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To comply with the ePrivacy Directive, consent is required both
to install apps and to place information, such as random identifiers, on
devices.208 Sharing data about individuals who have been diagnosed,
or tested positively with interoperable apps from other jurisdictions,
“should only be triggered by a voluntary action of the user.”209
However, the EDPB also states that “the mere fact that the use of
contact-tracing applications takes place on a voluntary basis does not
mean that the processing of personal data will necessarily be based on
consent.”210 In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) provides a legal basis for processing personal data, if
processing personal data is necessary for the performance of a task in
the public interest.211 National laws enacted to provide measures
allowing for the monitoring of epidemics may also be relied upon if
certain requirements are met.212 However, subjecting an individual to
a decision solely based on automated processing, which subsequently
produces a legal effect upon the individual, remains prohibited.213

208

Id.
EDPB, DATA PROTECTION IMPACT, supra note 34, at 2.
210 EUR. DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 04/2020 ON THE USE OF LOCATION DATA AND
CONTACT TRACING TOOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK 7 (2020), https://
edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_tracing_covid_
with_annex_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y78M-D7CZ] [hereinafter EDPB, GUIDELINES 04/2020].
211 Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6(1)(e), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
212 Council Regulation 2016/679, arts. 6(1)(c), 6(3), 9(1)−(2)(i), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
213 The Italian Data Protection Authority has clarified that an exposure alert is an automated
decision that has significant consequences for individuals. GARANTE PER LA PROTEZIONE DEI
DATI PERSONALI, OPINION ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE PROVISION OF AN
APPLICATION AIMED AT TRACKING COVID-19 INFECTIONS—APRIL 29, 2020 (2020), https://
www.garanteprivacy.it/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9328050
[https://perma.cc/
6ZNP-G8BK]. However, in the final authorization after the Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA), there are no specific references to Article 22 of the GDPR (governing automated decision
making), but the DPIA does require the algorithm used to be explained. GARANTE PER LA
PROTEZIONE DEI DATI PERSONALI, PROVISION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PROCESSING OF
PERSONAL DATA CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE COVID 19 ALERT SYSTEM—IMMUNE APP—1
JUNE 2020 (2020), https://www.gpdp.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/
9356568 [https://perma.cc/U92K-ADJQ].
209
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IV. SECURITY & PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS FOR MOBILE TRACKING DATA

Sociology scholars have long studied the complex relationship
between trust and cooperative behaviors.214 Specifically for COVID19–related surveillance technologies, researchers have demonstrated a
correlation between the willingness to adopt contact tracing apps and
their accuracy and privacy standards.215 However, within the context
of data sharing, public trust in information and communication
technology providers is strained in light of large-scale data breaches
and sales of consumer data to third parties.216 This skepticism was
highlighted in a recent poll that suggested Americans are more likely
to trust contact tracing apps offered by public health authorities than
Apple and Google, with the majority expressing doubt about whether
these companies would protect the privacy of their health data.217
Additional polling also found that Americans are divided on whether
it is acceptable for the government to use cellphones to track people
who have tested positively for SARS-CoV-2, with acceptance levels
falling in relation to the tracking of people who may have had contact
with someone who has tested positive.218
Without adequate legislation to safeguard personal information,
developers of contact tracing and exposure notification apps face an
uphill battle convincing users that sharing their data will only be
214 Tjeerd-Pieter van Staa et al., Big Health Data: The Need to Earn Public Trust, 354 BRIT.
MED. J. i3636 (2016).
215 GABRIEL KAPTCHUK ET AL., HOW GOOD IS GOOD ENOUGH FOR COVID19 APPS? THE
INFLUENCE OF BENEFITS, ACCURACY, AND PRIVACY ON WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT 8 (2020),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.04343.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3LC-M3YZ].
216 Long Cheng, Fang Liu & Danfeng (Daphne) Yao, Enterprise Data Breach: Causes,
Challenges, Prevention, and Future Directions, WIRES DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY, Sept.–Oct. 2017; see also Kurt Thomas et al., Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware?
Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials, in CCS ‘17: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM
SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 1421 (2017); LUCY
SIMKO ET AL., COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF PUBLIC
OPINION (2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.01553.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M8U-LGN3]; Dustin
Volz, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data From 500 Million Accounts in 2014, REUTERS (Sept. 22,
2016, 7:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-hackers-stole-datafrom-500-million-accounts-in-2014-idUSKCN11S16P [https://perma.cc/5YYL-QGS8].
217 The Wash. Post & Ctr. for Democracy & Civic Engagement, Washington Post–University
of Maryland National Poll, April 21–26, 2020, WASH. POST (May 21, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/context/washington-post-university-of-maryland-national-poll-april21-26-2020/3583b4e9-66be-4ed6-a457-f6630a550ddf/?itid=lk_inline_manual_3
[https://
perma.cc/B2YS-K2HF].
218 Auxier, supra note 143.
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limited to approved third parties, such as healthcare professionals and
public health authorities, and will only be collected, shared, and stored
for a limited time. Most crucially, developers will need to reassure
prospective users that law enforcement will not have data access.
Perhaps the most complicated aspect of digital contact tracing is
establishing how current laws could protect user privacy in proximity
and location data and other personal information.219
A.

Digital Tracking Technologies & U.S. Regulation

Government surveillance remains a contentious debate in the
United States, and privacy advocates have voiced concerns about
mission creep, where government entities and private actors could use
collected data beyond the scope and timeframe of an app’s intended
use.220 Contact tracing data collected in a centralized manner,
particularly by private entities, may provide public health authorities
with insights about how COVID-19 is spreading, who may be at a
higher risk of exposure, and where to allocate resources most
effectively and equitably.221 While the private sector is driving the
development of digital tools, both federal and state governments
remain interested in influencing their designs and data access
standards.222 Further complicating the issue is the “patchwork” of laws
that govern disclosure of collected data, where the constraints on thirdparty entities are much weaker than those that regulate disclosure for
telecommunications carriers.223
219

ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., TRACKING AND TRACING COVID: PROTECTING PRIVACY
DATA WHILE USING APPS AND BIOMETRICS (2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/
?ref=129_129655-7db0lu7dto&title=Tracking-and-Tracing-COVID-Protecting-privacy-and-datawhile-using [https://perma.cc/8BKQ-CVMW].
220 Guariglia, supra note 146.; Palantir Tech., supra note 146.
221 Levy, supra note 79; see, e.g., Responding to COVID-19, PALANTIR, https://
www.palantir.com/covid19 [https://perma.cc/67PA-Q5LK]; Thomas Brewster, Palantir, the $20
Billion, Peter Thiel–Backed Big Data Giant, Is Providing Coronavirus Monitoring to the CDC,
FORBES (Mar. 31, 2020, 5:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/03/31/
palantir-the-20-billion-peter-thiel-backed-big-data-giant-is-providing-a-coronavirus-monitoringtool-to-the-cdc/#7c78f5081595 [https://perma.cc/5TW3-EMCQ].
222 PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16. Many state laws already apply to contact tracing, such
as mini privacy acts and health record confidentiality laws.
223 Id. Aside from federal statutes, some states have laws that require government entities to
obtain a search warrant before accessing data on an electronic device. See, e.g., Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 2015 Cal. Stat. ch. 651 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE
AND
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In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court famously held in Carpenter v.
United States224 that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell-site location information.225 Carpenter has
demonstrably affected the impact of the third-party doctrine, which
pertains to the idea under the Fourth Amendment that an individual
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily turned over to other parties.226 The case ultimately focused
on the nature of the information obtained, rather than the nature of the
search by law enforcement.227
The Court’s ruling requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant
to access an individual’s historical whereabouts from the records of a
cellphone provider and will likely apply to other historically collected
geolocation data.228 Carpenter also created the rule of “technological
equivalence,” whereby the use of a technology may be considered a
“search” if it “gives [law enforcement] the power to gather
information that is the ‘modern-day equivalent’ of activity that has
been held to be a Fourth Amendment search.”229 With contact tracing
and exposure notification apps, the context of location and proximity
data could be postulated as comparable to specific geolocation
information given the nature of the data and the possibility of third
parties gathering information—invoking Carpenter’s warrant
requirement for gathering cell site location information and adding a
layer of protection against open access.230

§§ 1546−1546.2, 1546.4 (West 202)); Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act, 2019 Utah Laws
362 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23c-101.1−105 (West 2020)).
224 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
225 Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 358, 360 (2019)
(heralding Carpenter as the most important Fourth Amendment opinion in decades).
226 See Orin Kerr & Greg Nojeim, The Data Question: Should the Third-Party Records Doctrine
Be Revisited?, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_
data_question_should_the_third-party_records_doctrine_be_revisited
[https://perma.cc/9D2KANAT].
227 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
228 Id.; see also Katelyn Ringrose & Divya Ramjee, Watch Where You Walk: Law Enforcement
Surveillance and Protester Privacy, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 349, 355−57 (2020).
229 Ohm, supra note 225, at 360.
230 Divya Ramjee & Katelyn Ringrose, The Challenges of Forensic Genealogy: Dirty Data,
Electronic Evidence, and Privacy Concerns, 98 DENV. L. REV. 157, 183–84 (forthcoming 2021);
see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. Government collection of data from third-party companies
would most likely trigger a Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds of Katz v. United States’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” 389 U.S. 347, 360−62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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While major operating system developers are cautious about
third-party access to mobility data, including proximity and location
data, a relaxing of such restrictions for the sake of COVID-19 is
certainly possible—although generally improbable, due to privacy
concerns. Many privacy advocates have stressed the importance of
only collecting and sharing data after a user has provided consent or
opted in.231 However, some developers have indicated that they are
willing to share infection status, proximity data or location data, and
phone contacts with law enforcement in “legally justified cases.”232
Under the legal frameworks of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act,233 Stored Communications Act (SCA),234 and the
Telecommunications Act,235 there is also the possibility for electronic
communications associated with a contact tracing or exposure
notification app to be accessed by the federal government and law
enforcement, even though such data may contain potential health
information that would bar access by any entity not “authorized” to
access health and medical information.236 The SCA and
Telecommunications Act are most relevant, as they limit third-party
companies from voluntarily disclosing either location data or
proximity data to law enforcement, regardless of its originating
source.237
231 Joel Schectman, Christopher Bing & Jack Stubbs, Special Report: Cyber-Intel Firms Pitch
Governments on Spy Tools to Trace Coronavirus, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-spy-specialreport/special-report-cyber-intelfirms-pitch-governments-on-spy-tools-to-trace-coronavirus-idUSKCN22A2G1 [https://perma.cc/
G5PT-49Z8]; see also Foo Yun Chee, EU Urges Voluntary Use of Virus-Tracing Apps to Speed
Recovery from Pandemic, REUTERS (May 13, 2020, 4:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-eu-apps/eu-urges-voluntary-use-of-virus-tracing-apps-to-speed-recoveryfrom-pandemic-idUSKBN22P15H [https://perma.cc/83CG-RETZ].
232 Schectman et al., supra note 231.
233 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1848−59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–23).
234 Stored Communications Act (SCA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860−68 (1986)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12).
235 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
236 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9); see also Ramjee & Ringrose,
supra note 230, at 187–89.
237 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a); 47 U.S.C. §§ 222(c)(1), (f)(1); see PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note
16. A potential scenario may involve a third-party company app using a template that provides
location or proximity data to the government without user authorization. This information would
be protected as “content” or a “record or other information” under the SCA, and if such data is
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The Federal Trade Commission Act may also provide protections
against third-party companies that violate disclosure agreements, but
it may only be enforced by the federal government.238 It is unlikely
that the federal government would enforce such protections given that
the federal government would be the one seeking data.239 The FCC
could potentially intervene as well.240 The FCC could impose a fine
similar to the $200 million fine proposed against AT&T, Sprint, TMobile, and Verizon for disclosing location data to law enforcement
via third-party brokers.241
In addition to Carpenter, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
United States v. Jones stressed the highly sensitive nature of location
data.242 Utilizing Bluetooth technology does limit geolocation
surveillance but proximity data still retains the potential for reidentification—smartphones still broadcast an identifier, though
randomized and encrypted in some manner.243 There is a potential for
the government to require the public to download and use contact
tracing and exposure notification apps, triggering a Fourth
Amendment contest under the Jones test even if the app were to use
only Bluetooth technology.244 This type of mandate would also need
to survive a challenge bolstered by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause,245 which the Supreme Court, in 1868, interpreted as providing

stored or processed remotely, the SCA may limit disclosure to the government. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a); PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 5, 16 n.45. In contrast, Apple and Google’s
decentralized proposal is restricted to use by public health authorities, wherein users who opt in to
share diagnosis information would be agreeing to share this information with the government.
PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. This method involves the sharing of proximity keys,
which would be stored locally on a user’s device. Id.
238 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41−58); see also PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
239 See PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
240 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–02; see also PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6, 17 n.66−67.
241 Kim Lyons, AT&T, Sprint, Verizon, and T-Mobile Will Be Fined More than $200 Million for
Selling Customer Locations, Per Report, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://
www.theverge.com/2020/2/27/21156555/verizon-sprint-att-tmobile-fcc-fine-carriers-consumerdata-disclosure [https://perma.cc/BU4P-9DCN]; PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 6, 17
n.66−67.
242 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
243 LEITH & FARRELL, supra note 66; see also Newton, supra note 66.
244 Rozenshtein, supra note 148; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 404−08 (majority opinion).
245 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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a fundamental right to freedom of movement.246 With digital contact
tracing and exposure notification requiring surveillance of all
individuals, not just those who test positive for SARS-CoV-2, the
constitutionality of contact tracing and exposure notification would
rely on analysis of the Fourth Amendment’s special needs doctrine247
and raise concerns similar to those involved with the USA PATRIOT
Act.248
B.

Accountability Measures

Much of the discussion regarding contact tracing and exposure
notification apps has not adequately addressed requirements for public
engagement at a level that would optimize epidemiological value.249
Adoption of beneficial public health measures and behaviors depends
on a number of factors, especially public understanding of the
potential benefits for themselves250 and their community.251 Previous
studies have demonstrated the utility of digital contact tracing
initiatives, albeit not at the scale necessary to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19, in controlling infection spread.252
246 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 170−71, 180 (1868) (defining freedom of movement as “the
right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them”).
247 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
248 Rozenshtein, supra note 148 (noting that constitutional concerns may arise that are similar
to those raised regarding “the National Security Agency’s telephony metadata program under
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act”).
249 To promote an inclusive digital public health response, a proposal put forth by medical and
public health experts at the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and Johns Hopkins Center
for Health Security is for digital public health responses to reflect the range of values that are
important to individuals, or what they refer to as “values in design.” JOHNS HOPKINS PROJECT,
supra note 52, at 10. The Hopkins group notes that these “values may include privacy, but also
autonomy, efficiency, equity, or others” and that “[t]echnology design should reflect an appropriate
balance and prioritization of identified values.” Id.
250 Grace Shin et al., Wearable Activity Trackers, Accuracy, Adoption, Acceptance and Health
Impact: A Systematic Literature Review, 93 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 103153 (2019); see also
Johannes Brug et al., SARS Risk Perception, Knowledge, Precautions, and Information Sources,
the Netherlands, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1486 (2004).
251 Atika Qazi et al., Analyzing Situational Awareness Through Public Opinion to Predict
Adoption of Social Distancing Amid Pandemic COVID‐19, 92 J. MED. VIROLOGY 849 (2020).
252 Lisa O. Danquah et al., Use of a Mobile Application for Ebola Contact Tracing and
Monitoring in Northern Sierra Leone: A Proof-of-Concept Study, 19 BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES
810 (2019); see also Mark Zastrow, Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Apps: Can They Slow the Spread
of COVID-19?, NATURE (May 19, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01514-2
[https://perma.cc/C56E-8MNC].
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Public trust is a central piece of the puzzle when implementing
contact tracing and exposure notification apps. Not only do privacy
laws need to be concisely explained to potential users when opting in,
but there also needs to be some level of guarantee that all aspects of
the system protect internal data and protect from unauthorized external
access. Absent meaningful safeguards, the public remains concerned
that the collected data may be misappropriated, potentially even being
used for targeting and infringing on civil liberties.253 Additionally, the
public needs to believe that companies are being genuinely forthright
with the limitations of their technologies254—realizing that these apps
should not be marketed as some sort of mandated scientific tool but
rather a mechanism to improve individual health while simultaneously
improving public health and the greater good.255
Google and Apple stipulate a number of terms for public health
authorities to abide by in order to use the GAEN API.256 Nevertheless,
this still opens the field to multiple companies, with varying standards
of data privacy policies, to be responsible for appropriately harvesting
relevant SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 information without
compromising people’s personal data and related metadata.257 Clear
guidelines could provide as to how Google and Apple should develop
and update their APIs to ensure appropriate protections for location
and health information. Additionally, such guidelines must be
established that simplify the sharing of personal data and potential
electronic health information for pandemic response at the state and
federal levels while still preserving and upholding privacy rights.

253

PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
See generally Baobao Zhang et al., Americans’ Perceptions of Privacy and Surveillance in
the COVID-19 Pandemic, OSF PREPRINTS, Dec. 8, 2020, https://osf.io/9wz3y [https://perma.cc/
QF2G-8UGA].
255 Alia E. Dastagir, Some People Listen to Health Experts, Others Ignore Them: What It Means
for America’s Future with COVID-19, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2020, 6:22 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/08/15/coronavirus-restrictions-why-americans-dontfollow-rules-wear-face-masks/3368667001 [https://perma.cc/8F4E-54WK].
256 See GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Additional Terms, supra note 170.
257 Trusting private sector entities with valuable data, including mobility data (and potentially
social media and search data) poses another issue that should be discussed during policy
development—antitrust. By prioritizing solutions offered by major tech players, such as Google,
Apple, Facebook, or Microsoft, the U.S. government would effectively be further entrenching their
statuses as tech leviathans by implicitly discouraging others from entering the market, as new
technologies and new companies will have neither the market share nor the technological
infrastructure to support a robust contact tracing system.
254
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Transparency about data practices is a fundamental trust-based
incentive to promote responsible data use.258 Providing detailed Data
Protection Impact Assessments,259 as required by the GDPR, and
making source code available for public scrutiny improves the ability
for scientific experts, privacy watchdogs, and regulators to promote
accountability.260 For instance, both Germany and Ireland have opted
to make their source code public,261 an approach encouraged by EU
institutions.262 External oversight and consequences for misuse and
abuse are also crucial elements of accountability. Guidance from the
EU Commission states that EU “Data Protection Authorities should be
fully involved and consulted in the context of the development of the
app and they should keep its deployment under review.”263 Due to the
nascence of the deployment of digital tools for contact tracing,
continuous performance monitoring and auditing of the app
functionality is also important to assess accuracy and effectiveness
over time.264 In particular, unforeseen results, such as disparate
impact, should be proactively identified and mitigated in an ongoing
manner.
Safeguarding an individual’s general personal data has always
been a challenge in contact tracing,265 now potentially more
complicated with the proliferation of automated processing and the
258

IDAC, supra note 6.
See, e.g., COVID Alert: COVID-19 Exposure Notification Application Privacy Assessment,
GOV’T OF CAN.
(Oct. 2020), https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/diseases/
coronavirus-disease-covid-19/covid-alert/privacy-policy/assessment.html [https://perma.cc/3S872TK2]; FED. REPUBLIC OF GER., CORONA WARN APP: BERICHT ZUR DATENSCHUTZFOLGENABSCHÄTZUNG FÜR DIE CORONA-WARN-APP [DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT
REPORT FOR THE CORONA WARN APP] (2020), https://www.coronawarn.app/assets/documents/
cwa-datenschutz-folgenabschaetzung.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9JN-9HN7].
260 EDPB, GUIDELINES 04/2020, supra note 210, at 8 (advising that “source code should be
made publicly available for the widest possible scrutiny”); see also FINCH ET AL., supra note 128.
261 Jee, supra note 158.
262 Resolution on EU Coordinated Action to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic and Its
Consequences, EUR. PARL. DOC. P9_TA-PROV(2020)0054 (2020).
263 Commission Guidance on Apps Supporting the Fight Against COVID 19 Pandemic in
Relation to Data Protection, 2020 O.J. (C 124I) 9.
264 EDPB, GUIDELINES 04/2020, supra note 210.
265 MOLLY BODE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., CONTACT TRACING FOR COVID-19: NEW
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/
McKinsey/Industries/Public%20and%20Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Contact%20tracing%
20for%20COVID%2019%20New%20considerations%20for%20its%20practical%20application/
Contact-tracing-for-covid-19-new-considerations-May-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FC3F-QUVY].
259
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collection of unique digital identifiers. Consumers need to believe that
the level of anonymization used for personal data is sufficient for
maintaining privacy and that their data will not be used in ways that
may harm them.266 Studies have already demonstrated that despite the
removal of personal-identifying data and generating randomized IDs,
it may still be possible to determine identities in large medical
datasets.267 Along with potentially being personally identified, there is
also concern that the centralized contact tracing-generated social
graphs268 may also reveal identifying information about known
associates.269 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) released
guidelines stressing that users should not be forced to use an app by
the U.S. government, an employer, or a school, and there should also
be protections to prevent abuse of social graphs by such entities.270
V. PROPOSED REGULATION

Consistent, concise, and evidence-based communications from
trusted sources, including public health officials and other scientific
authorities, are likely to be especially important to promote the
adoption of contact tracing or exposure notification apps.271 However,
266 See generally Monica Anderson & Brooke Auxier, Most Americans Don’t Think Cellphone
Tracking Will Help Limit COVID-19, Are Divided on Whether It’s Acceptable, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/16/most-americans-dont-thinkcellphone-tracking-will-help-limit-covid-19-are-divided-on-whether-its-acceptable
[https://
perma.cc/DNA5-APBP].
267 Rocher et al., supra note 64, at 2.
268 A social graph is a graph that displays the interconnected relationships in a user’s social
network. See Boonsri Dickinson, So What the Heck Is the ‘Social Graph’ Facebook Keeps Talking
About?, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2012, 8:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/explainer-whatexactly-is-the-social-graph-2012-3 [https://perma.cc/QPY3-M5DH]; Max I. Fiest, Note, Why a
Data Disclosure Law Is (Likely) Unconstitutional, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 556–17 (2020).
269 BODE ET AL., supra note 265.
270 DANIEL KAHN GILLMOR, ACLU, PRINCIPLES FOR TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED CONTACTTRACING (2020), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_white_paper_-_
contact_tracing_principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/98UY-BAPP].
271 Hui Wang et al., Communicating in a Public Health Crisis, 2 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH E503,
E503 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(20)30197-7/
fulltext [https://perma.cc/L925-747J]; see also Digital Contact Tracing Tools, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 26, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/
contact-tracing/contact-tracing-plan/digital-contact-tracing-tools.html
[https://perma.cc/26RZGM6H] (stating that “[s]ocial mobilization and mass marketing media campaigns are required to
gain a critical mass behind one or more application[s] for broad public usage”); JOHNS HOPKINS
PROJECT, supra note 52, at 7; Holder, supra note 159.
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fragmentation of app design and deployment at the state level has
heightened confusion in the United States, and public messaging has
generally been inconsistent around this topic.272 For instance, in the
wake of overwhelming protests following the murder of George
Floyd, the Commissioner of Minnesota’s Department of Public Safety
publicly stated that law enforcement was conducting “contact
tracing.”273 This false conflation between contact tracing in the context
of public health and standard law enforcement investigations may
potentially undermine public health efforts and reduce the willingness
of individuals to participate in contact tracing, especially in
marginalized communities that are often subjected to over-policing.274
Accordingly, Congress and several state legislatures have proposed
legislation that would impose strict purpose, retention, and sharing
limitations on data collected for contact tracing and exposure
notification purposes, and to prevent law enforcement and
immigration authorities from accessing or using contact tracing and
exposure notification information.275

272 Ashkan Soltani, Ryan Calo & Carl Bergstrom, Contact-Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to
the COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/
inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster [https://perma.cc/ZNT7BESL]; see also Thomas Germain, How to Protect Phone Privacy and Security During a Protest,
CONSUMER REPS. (June 3, 2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/protect-phoneprivacy-security-during-a-protest [https://perma.cc/XD94-857Q] (providing a number of
recommendations to protesters, such as to disable location tracking (GPS, Bluetooth, WiFi), to turn
on airplane mode, to turn phone off, and/or to use a burner phone).
273 Sara Morrison, Minnesota Law Enforcement Isn’t “Contact Tracing” Protesters, Despite an
Official’s Comment, VOX (June 1, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/1/
21277393/minnesota-protesters-contact-tracing-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/K3XT-JE8X].
274 See generally Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy:
Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY
253, 276 (2004) (discussing the negative reactions people experience as a result “of profiling,
regardless of whether they have experienced it or believe that it generally occurs in their
neighborhood and city”); see also Patricia Y. Warren, The Continuing Significance of Race: An
Analysis Across Two Levels of Policing, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1025, 1025, 1027−30 (2010) (discussing
the “significant race variation in perceptions of the police, with [B]lack citizens holding lower
levels of trust than do whites . . . because they frequently perceive police as unjust and racially
biased”).
275 Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong § 8 (2020) (introduced by Senators
Cantwell and Cassidy on June 1, 2020); COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020,
S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Senator Wicker on May 7, 2020); Public Health
Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Senator Blumenthal on May
14, 2020); Assemb. A10500C, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (introduced by Assembly
Member Richard Gottfried) (relating to the confidentiality of contact tracing information); Assemb.
660, 2019–2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (introduced by Assembly Member Marc Levine).

148

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2021

Manual contact tracing efforts are clearly no match for the current
scale of the pandemic, and many contact tracers rapidly hired remain
inadequately trained to perform case investigation, a function that the
CDC has referred to as a “specialized skill.”276 Thus far, public
engagement with manual contact tracers has also been
disappointing.277 In an attempt to earn trust, New York enacted a law
requiring COVID-19 contact tracers to be “representative of the
cultural and linguistic diversity of the communities in which they
serve.”278 As outlined above in Parts II and III, there are a number of
federal regulatory agencies, along with the U.S. Congress, that can
establish federal-level privacy and security standards, as well as
mandates for contact tracing app adoption amongst the public. It
would be feasible to establish a federal network, and considering that
waves of COVID-19 are expected to continue well into 2021, now
would be the time for the federal government to take a proactive
stance.
Regulatory powers need to take initiative and provide concise
guidance on public health surveillance, perhaps involving the creation
of a public health oversight body that is independent from political or
corporate interests. Forthcoming research additionally suggests that
the issue of contact tracing is not necessarily ideological or has not yet
been politicized, creating opportunities for bipartisan elite to mobilize
constituents to opt in.279 This means there is potential for a
comprehensive national strategy with bipartisan backing that would
encourage the general public to voluntarily participate in digital
contact tracing initiatives. For instance, Senator Warren introduced
legislation for a national contact tracing program, calling for it to be
included in a future pandemic response package that Congress
passes.280 Supported by many Democratic co-sponsors, the

276 CDC, CASE INVESTIGATION AND CONTACT TRACING, supra note 1 (stating that manual
contact tracers require “training, supervision, and access to social and medical support for patients
and contacts”).
277 See, e.g., Holder, supra note 159 (describing interactions a Florida contact tracer has
experienced).
278 2020 N.Y. Sess. Laws 115 (McKinney).
279 Zhang et al., supra note 254.
280 Coronavirus Containment Corps Act, S. 3848, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020) (introduced by
Senator Warren); see also Press Release, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Levin, Merkley, Smith
Introduce Legislation for a National Contact Tracing Program (May 14, 2020), https://
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Coronavirus Containment Corps Act would require the CDC to
develop a national contact tracing strategy and create privacy
protections relating to manual contact tracing and digital tools.281
Senator Schatz has also introduced legislation that would require the
CDC to establish a national plan for contact tracing and testing.282
In April 2020, FTC Commissioner Christine Wilson expressed
her views on “Privacy in the Time of COVID-19.”283 In the past,
Commissioner Wilson has called for Congress to enact comprehensive
federal privacy legislation.284 However, in the midst of the public
health crisis, Commissioner Wilson acknowledged that legislators are
focused on enacting urgent emergency response measures and called
for governments to follow the principles of necessity and
proportionality in making demands or requests for data sharing from
private companies during the public health emergency.285 The FTC
should establish rules and accountability measures for digital contact
tracing and exposure notification tools for technology and
communication companies. Thus far, the FTC has not been forced to
create protective measures for consumers, despite the blatant
necessity.286
The proposed COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020,
introduced by leading Senate Republicans to regulate COVID-19–
www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-levin-merkley-smith-introducelegislation-for-a-national-contact-tracing-program [https://perma.cc/3YGU-7N2N].
281 S. 3848; Press Release, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, supra note 280.
282 Jobs to Fight COVID-19 Act of 2020, S. 3828, 116th Cong. (2020).
283 Christine Wilson, Privacy in the Time of COVID-19, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/04/15/privacy-in-the-time-of-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/
7DR8-WMN4].
284 Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at the Future of Privacy Forum: A Defining
Moment for Privacy: The Time Is Ripe for Federal Privacy Legislation (Feb. 6, 2020), at 13, https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1566337/commissioner_wilson_privacy_
forum_speech_02-06-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2TD-4LJD] (stating that the Commissioner
called to address emerging regulatory gaps; to provide consumers with clarity about “how their
data is [sic] collected, used, and shared”; and to promote predictability and certainty for businesses).
285 Wilson, supra note 283.
286 On August 5, 2020, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
convened a hearing titled “Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission.” Oversight of the Federal
Trade Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2020)
(statement of Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, FTC). At the hearing, Chairman Joseph J. Simons called
for more authority for the FTC, specifically requesting “(1) the ability to seek civil penalties, (2)
jurisdiction over non-profits and common carriers, and (3) targeted Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) rulemaking authority to ensure the law keeps pace with changes in technology and the
market.” Id. at 2.
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related data, neither provides additional resources for the FTC to
create enforcement mechanisms for consumer privacy protections nor
advocates for any other rule-making authority.287 It would, however,
require the FTC to “issue guidelines recommending best practices for
covered entities to minimize the collection, processing, and transfer of
covered data.”288 In contrast, the Public Health Emergency Privacy
Act, introduced more recently by leading Senate Democrats, does
advocate for the FTC, as well as HHS, to participate in regulatory
capacities for a broad range of covered entities, including contact
tracing apps, that handle and process COVID-19 consumer data.289
These two federal bills were introduced to regulate data collected,
used, and shared for COVID-19–related purposes, i.e., emergency
health data, and include voluntary adoption and user consent as key
components.290 Both bills contain provisions requiring individual
consent and would prohibit covered entities from using emergency
health data for purposes unrelated to responding to COVID-19.291
However, despite many substantive similarities between the two
proposals, significant differences remain in terms of enforcement
mechanisms, preservation of existing state laws, anti-discrimination,
research exemptions, and scope.292 These are familiar areas of debate
regarding comprehensive federal privacy legislation.293 Due to
partisan divides, it is unlikely that either of these proposals will be
enacted.
It is therefore notable that the ENPA has bipartisan support to
create strong legal safeguards for users whose personal data are

287 COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced
by Senator Wicker on May 7, 2020).
288 Id. at § 3(g)(2).
289 Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Senator
Blumenthal on May 14, 2020).
290 S. 3363, § 3; S. 3749, §§ 2–3.
291 S. 3363, § 3; S. 3749, §§ 2–3.
292 Pollyanna Sanderson, Stacey Gray & Katelyn Ringrose, Newly Released COVID-19 Privacy
Bills Would Regulate Pandemic-Related Data, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://fpf.org/
2020/05/15/newly-released-covid-19-privacy-bills-would-regulate-pandemic-related-data [https://
perma.cc/UFW9-NG3P].
293 See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Matthew R. Baker & Jonathon J. Duzak-Forestier, A Once
and Future Federal Privacy Law?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2020, https://
www.privacysecurityacademy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Once-Future-Federal-PrivacyLaw-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JLT-NCFQ].
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collected by private entities through “automated exposure notification
services,” i.e., contact tracing apps and exposure notification apps.294
Many provisions of this narrower bill align with longstanding privacy
principles, as well as the requirements for apps contained in GAEN’s
Terms.295 However, unlike the Terms,296 the ENPA would apply more
broadly to all contact tracing and exposure notification apps.297 In
addition to requiring consent, the bill contains numerous provisions to
guard against mission creep.298 App operators would also be
prohibited from using data for commercial purposes or transferring
data to executive agencies for secondary purposes (such as law or
immigration enforcement).299
To promote accountability and oversight, the ENPA includes a
provision that would extend the purview of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) to federally declared public
health emergencies.300 Currently, the PCLOB is responsible for
ensuring that federal counterterrorism actions appropriately safeguard
privacy and civil liberties.301 The ENPA also features a strong antidiscrimination provision302 and would require contact tracing and
exposure notification apps to process only “authorized diagnos[es],”
and app operators would be required to “collaborate with a public
health authority.”303 To comply with this provision, more guidance is
likely necessary to determine the extent to which private entities (such
as employers) would need to collaborate with public health authorities.

294

See Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861 § 3 116th Cong. (2020).
GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Additional Terms, supra note 170.
296 GOOGLE, Exposure Notifications Terms, supra note 21.
297 S. 3861.
298 Id. App operators would be prohibited from collecting or processing data beyond the
“minimum amount necessary to implement an automated exposure notification service for public
health purposes” related to COVID-19. Id. at § 5(a)(1).
299 See S. 3861.
300 Id. § 9(b).
301 History and Mission, U.S. PRIV. & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/About/
HistoryMission [https://perma.cc/4D39-YH6B].
302 S. 3861, § 8. The ENPA’s anti-discrimination provision would apply to restaurants,
educational institutions, hotels, retailers, and other places of “public accommodation” (as defined
in Section 301 of the Americans With Disabilities Act). Id. If passed, the bill would make it
unlawful for these kinds of establishments to use data from automated exposure notification
services to deny people entry, services, or otherwise discriminate against them. Id.
303 Id. §§ 2(3), 3(a)−(b), 4(a)(2).
295
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Depending on how the anti-discrimination provision is
interpreted, employers could be precluded from implementing contact
tracing and exposure notification apps in the workplace.304 In contrast,
the provision could be interpreted to mean that a developer of an
enterprise solution or an employer must seek guidance, input, or
approval from a public health authority. In this way, the provision
could promote the legitimacy of enterprise contact tracing solutions
by ensuring that they are designed and implemented to support the
work of public health authorities. However, due to significant legal
and contextual differences, a more practicable alternative solution
may be to create separate regulatory frameworks for consumer-based
apps and employer-based apps.
Although none of these federal proposals are likely to pass in the
near future, they contain many similar elements to various state-level
proposals that have considerable support. For instance, the New York
State Senate and Assembly passed a bill intended to protect the
confidentiality of contact tracing information and prohibit law and
immigration enforcement from accessing the information.305 In
August 2020, the California legislature almost passed a similar bill,
which would have required that data collected for the purpose of
contact tracing be used, maintained, or disclosed only to facilitate
contact tracing efforts, and would have prohibited law enforcement
from participating in contact tracing.306 Legislative analysis of the bill
states that effective contact tracing depends on the availability of
complete data, which in turn depends on the participation and
openness of individuals who trust that their data will not be misused.307

304 For instance, the app “Check-In” is suggested for use by employers, and its website states
that the app is “[m]ost effective when mandated for employees located within company property,
or geofence.” Check-In: A PwC Product, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/products/checkin.html?WT.mc_id=CT3-PL300-DM1-TR1-LS4-ND30-PR1-CN_CheckIn-Checkin&eq=CT3PL300-DM1-CN_CheckIn-Checkin&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIu6GUhns6wIVUpJbCh0SvwVIEAAYASAAEgIVkPD_Bw [https://perma.cc/K9JM-PNNG].
305 Assemb. A10500C, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (introduced by Assembly Member
Richard Gottfried) (relating to the confidentiality of contact tracing information); S. S8450C, 2019–
2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (introduced by State Senator Gustavo Rivera).
306 Assemb. 660, 2019–2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (introduced by Assembly Member
Marc Levine).
307 PERSONAL INFORMATION: CONTACT TRACING, Assemb. 660, S. Judiciary Comm., 2019–
2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), https://sjud.senate.ca.gov/sites/sjud.senate.ca.gov/files/ab_
660_levine_senate_judiciary_committee_analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA7U-Q6BB].
The
legislative analysis observes that individuals are concerned about the potential misuse of their data,
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The ACLU, and many other privacy and consumer advocacy
organizations, supports these bills.308
Aiming to promote trust more broadly in collection, use, and
sharing of data to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, another New
York bill contains transparency requirements, data minimization
obligations, retention limitations, and data security obligations for
government entities and third-party recipients of emergency health
data.309 On July 30, 2020, the New Jersey Assembly passed similar,
but narrower legislation, which would require public health authorities
and “third part[ies]” to abide by purpose and retention limitations for
contact tracing data.310 California almost passed a similar bill.311
However, opponents argued that it put privacy before public health,
and that the anti-discrimination provisions would deny covered
entities the ability to mitigate health risks to consumers and employees
posed by other individuals.312
and that effective regulation can make individuals more likely to download a contact tracing app,
share information about their contacts, and change their behavior. Id. at 6−7.
[T]he process is undermined and trust is broken if that data can be used for other purposes
or combined with other data. For example, it is arguably a problematic practice, and a
breach of a user’s reasonable expectations, to allow such information to be used for other
business purposes, such as profiling consumers or marketing to them, or for the
information to be provided to other public entities, including federal authorities, for any
purposes other than stemming the spread of a communicable disease.
Id. at 8. Public health is about building trust. It is essential to stop misuse while encouraging positive
use of data.
308 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Rights Groups, Health Advocates and
Public Defenders Celebrate Passage of Legislation to Protect Contact Tracing Data from Law
Enforcement: Amid Dual Crises of Covid-19 Pandemic & Police Abuse, Advocates Call For
Governor Cuomo to Sign the Bill Immediately (July 23, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/civil-rights-groups-health-advocates-and-public-defenders-celebrate-passage
[https://
perma.cc/9JMA-2RQN].
309 S. S8448D, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (introduced by State Senator Kevin Thomas
on June 3, 2020) (“Relates to requirements for the collection and use of emergency health data and
personal information and the use of technology to aid during COVID-19.”).
310 Assemb. 4170, 219th Leg. (N.J. 2020). The New Jersey Senate received the bill on August
3, 2020. Id. It was then referred to the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens
Committee. Id.
311 Technology-Assisted Contact Tracing Public Accountability and Consent Terms (TACTPACT) Act, Assemb. 1782, 2019–2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). This bill would have
comprehensively regulated digital contact tracing tools, called “technology-assisted contact
tracing,” offered by public health entities and businesses. Id. The bill would also have prohibited
discrimination based on participation in technology-assisted contact tracing. Id.
312 Hearing on Assemb. 1782 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2019–2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2020) (testimony of Shoeb Mohammed, Policy Advocate, CalChamber & Laura Curtis, Senior
Director of State Affairs for California and Hawaii, CompTIA).
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On January 14, 2021, the Washington Privacy Act of 2021
(WPA) had its first Public hearing in the Washington State Senate
Committee on Environment, Energy & Technology.313 The
Washington State Legislature considered two previous iterations of
the comprehensive data privacy legislation, but both narrowly failed
to pass into law.314 This year, the WPA contains sections to
specifically regulate uses of “geolocation data, proximity data, or
personal health data” for detecting COVID-19 symptoms, enabling
automated contact tracing, or identifying outbreak hotspots.315 Private
and public sector entities would be regulated, including institutions of
higher education.316 The bill also contains individual consent
requirements and creates various individual rights (access, correction,
deletion, and processing opt out).317 It also contains various
responsibilities and restrictions for data handlers, such as purpose
specification, data minimization, data retention limitation,
confidentiality, security, and transparency.318 Finally, the WPA would
prohibit entities from disclosing covered data to law enforcement,
selling the data, and sharing it in the absence of a contract.319
Unless appropriate guardrails are put in place, data collected by
governments through contact tracing and exposure notification tools
and apps could be used in unexpected, inappropriate, or even harmful
ways.320 This issue has frequently been cited as a factor undermining
the willingness of individuals to participate in contact tracing,

313 Washington Privacy Act, S. 5062, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021); see SB 5062—2021–
22: Bill History, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=
5062&Year=2021&Initiative=False [https://perma.cc/M2V3-5C7A].
314 Khari Johnson, Washington Privacy Act Fails Again, but State Legislature Passed Facial
Recognition Regulation, VENTUREBEAT: MACHINE (Mar. 12, 2020, 6:09 PM), https://
venturebeat.com/2020/03/12/washington-privacy-act-fails-in-state-legislature-again
[https://
perma.cc/N5CF-PESJ]; Rick Morgan, State Lawmakers Take Another Crack at Protecting
Consumer Data Privacy, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Jan. 20, 2021, 6:16 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2021/01/20/wpa-wtia-state-legislature.html
[https://perma.cc/97ZC-9GNZ].
315 S. 5062 § 201(7).
316 Id. §§ 201(6), 301(2).
317 Id. §§ 202(1)(b), 203.
318 Id. § 207.
319 Id. § 202.
320 See supra Part IV.
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particularly among over-policed and undocumented communities.321
As previously outlined in Part I, contact tracing apps designed in a
decentralized manner adopt a privacy-by-design322 approach,
effectively cutting government entities and tech companies out of the
loop, matching the user ID on each mobile device rather than in a
centralized server. “Privacy-by-design” is a deliberate and systematic
approach to privacy and data security, whereby privacy and security
is built in to the design of products and services from the outset.323 It
has been advocated for by the FTC,324 as well as overseas in Europe.325
In the absence of adequate legal regulation in the United States to
promote public trust and to prevent inappropriate data sharing or
usage, technology providers have been left with little choice but to
build in these essential regulatory protections by design,326 inevitably
making functionality and usability tradeoffs. Adequate legal
regulation in this space could create new avenues for greater
technological creativity and functionality. This would allow for the
collection and use of digital contact tracing and exposure notification
data by PHAs to improve calculations about the accuracy of alert
notifications, to enable PHAs to suppress notifications in “edge cases”
when risk of inferential identification is high, to identify outbreak
hotspots, and to use for COVID-19 research purposes. It is evident that
there is an urgent need for comprehensive federal privacy legislation
to promote public trust and adoption of socially beneficial digital
321 See PERSONAL INFORMATION: CONTACT TRACING, Assemb. 660, S. Judiciary Comm.,
2019–2020 Legis. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
322 See Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks at the Privacy by Design Conference: Privacy
by Design and the New Privacy Framework of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (June 13, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-design-and-newprivacy-framework-u.s.federal-trade-commission/120613privacydesign.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5ESV-8QMX].
323 See id.
324 See id.
325 Privacy
by Design, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY, https://
www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/data-protection/privacy-by-design [https://perma.cc/6HFB-5CX5].
326 Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998), is foundational scholarship that observes that for digital
information and network environments, “law and government regulation are not the only source of
rule-making.” Id. at 554. In addition, “[t]echnological capabilities and system design choices” and
standards “impose rules on participants.” Id. The “Article argues . . . that the set of rules for
information flows imposed by technology and communication networks” must be understood,
consciously recognized, and encouraged by policymakers. Id. at 555; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006).
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products and services, to set clearer rules of the road for businesses,
and to promote digital innovation.327
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR CONTACT TRACING APPS

Contact tracing apps are not the only mechanism available for
collecting and aggregating relevant surveillance information; data can
also be aggregated from social media and search engine results to
observe population-level trends.328 Since aggregated data is not
associated with a known individual, it has fewer privacy risks than
individualized location data, though location data is still challenging
to fully anonymize.329 As discussed previously in Part IV, third-party
companies are a rich source for such data, and government entities can
already access location data in the absence of a warrant by purchasing
it from these data brokers.330 In lieu of deploying any custom contact

327 More than a dozen legislative proposals were introduced in the 116th Congress to
comprehensively regulate personal information. There are currently two leading proposals for
comprehensive privacy legislation, which share considerable similarities. The Chair of the Senate
Commerce Committee, Senator Wicker (R-MS), introduced the SAFE DATA Act on September
17, 2020. S. 4626, 116th Cong. (2020). Ranking Member Senator Cantwell (D-WA) introduced the
Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act (COPRA) in November 2019. S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019);
see also Cameron F. Kerry et al., Bridging the Gaps: A Path Forward to Federal Privacy
Legislation, BROOKINGS INST. (June 3, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/bridging-thegaps-a-path-forward-to-federal-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/LK9S-NDUB].
328 If many people in a certain location enter similar symptoms into a search engine, this may
be an early warning of a potential outbreak hotspot. See Farzad Mostashari & Tom Frieden,
Technology Companies Can Help Fight Covid-19, CNN (May 13, 2020, 4:37 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/05/13/health/coronavirus-tech-companies-fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/
8DYQ-RZGY]. For instance, Google’s Community Mobility Reports and Facebook’s “Mobility
Dashboard “provid[e] de-identified, aggregate data on how communities . . . respond[] to shelterat-home orders and physical distancing.” Id. Facebook also opened a symptom survey for its users,
which may be used by epidemiologists to forecast where COVID-19 may hit next. Id.
329 Enlisting Big Data in the Fight Against Coronavirus: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com.,
Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. 2, 8−9 (2020) (testimony and statement of Stacey Gray, Senior
Counsel, Future of Privacy Forum); see also Enlisting Big Data in the Fight Against Coronavirus:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. 11 (2020) (Stacey Gray, Senior
Counsel, Future of Privacy Forum, Answers to Questions Submitted by Members of the S. Comm.
on Com., Sci., and Transp.).
330 See discussion supra Part IV; PANDURANGA ET AL., supra note 16; see also Joseph Cox,
Secret Service Bought Phone Location Data from Apps, Contract Confirms, VICE (Aug. 17, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jgxk3g/secret-service-phone-location-data-babelstreet [https://perma.cc/CUF8-EH59]; Joseph Cox, Customs and Border Protection Paid $476,000
to a Location Data Firm in New Deal, VICE (Aug. 25, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/k7qyv3/customs-border-protection-venntel-location-data-dhs [https://perma.cc/992JML4M].
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tracing solutions, private actors may already have tools available to
them that could assist in the contact tracing process.
Digital advertising firms have long considered real-time location
data as one of the many identifiers used to deliver relevant
advertisements, along with associated device specific IDs (e.g.,
Google Advertising ID (GAID)/Android Advertising ID (AAID) and
Apple’s Advertising Identifier (IDFA)).331 However, only a fraction of
advertising requests transacted between mobile devices and ad
delivery platforms are accurate within fifty to one hundred meters of
a specific location.332 This is primarily due to the fact that location
data, sent as part of advertising queries, does not often utilize the
precise location information built into mobile operating systems.333
Thus, an ad-tech based solution for contact tracing needs to be
improved in both precision and accuracy to be effective, potentially
by using operating system level tools like GPS location, cell site
location data, and proximity to WiFi networks.
In general, these practices are facing increased scrutiny from
bipartisan lawmakers, who are calling on the FTC to investigate the
online advertiser economy.334 In August 2020, a group of lawmakers
sent a letter to Mobilewalla after it emerged that the company had
potentially used location data collected from cellphones to identify
specific characteristics of American protesters at Black Lives Matter
demonstrations.335 The company is part of an “ecosystem of data
brokers that purchase or collect data from web browsers and apps
331 Santiago Petrone, Accessing the Advertising ID on Google and iOS Devices, MEDIUM, (Feb.
26, 2019), https://medium.com/applike/accessing-the-advertising-id-on-google-and-ios-devicesccd9097a3222 [https://perma.cc/Q4FA-QYH3].
332 Robert Williams, Study: Most Location-Based Ad Spending Is Wasted on Bad Targeting,
MARKETING DIVE (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.mobilemarketer.com/news/study-most-locationbased-ad-spending-is-wasted-on-bad-targeting/561908 [https://perma.cc/6U9D-GTVK].
333 Id.
334 Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Bill Cassidy, Sen. Maria Cantwell, Sen. Sherrod Brown,
Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Sen. Edward J. Markey, Cong. Member Anna G. Eshoo, Cong. Member
Zoe Lofgren, Cong. Member Yvette D. Clarke & Cong. Member Ro Khanna to Joseph J. Simons,
FTC Chairman (July 31, 2020), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/073120%
20Wyden%20Cassidy%20Led%20FTC%20Investigation%20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WG3KAMC].
335 Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman, House Comm. on
Oversight & Reform, Sen. Ron Wyden & Cong. Member Mark DeSaulnier to Anindya Datta, CEO
& Chairman, Mobilewalla (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2020.08.03%20Letter%20to%20data%20broker%20Mobilewalla.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4BR4CDJ].
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installed on Americans’ mobile devices.”336 After having conducted
an investigation into the data-sharing ecosystem, Senator Wyden has
stated that he plans to introduce a bill titled “The Fourth Amendment
is Not for Sale Act,” which would prevent law enforcement from
buying personal information from data brokers to circumvent the usual
warrant process.337
Nevertheless, privacy protections remain a major aspect in
creating a contact tracing and exposure notification system that is not
only safe, but is also trusted to be safe.338 An option to consider is the
use of differential privacy, where an algorithm could potentially be
used to read the data on an individual’s phone and only broadcast
relevant information on infection status and, perhaps, previous
locations without broadcasting personal data and metadata.339
Researchers at Harvard University have developed a differential
privacy tool that could be implemented in contact tracing and exposure
notification apps to help address privacy concerns while still retaining
functionality.340 Such apps developed in the United States should also
consider compatibility with contact tracing digital surveillance
programs in other countries. International travel accelerated the global
spread of COVID-19, and it is to be expected that any future
pandemics would follow similarly.341
When considering that ultimately a global framework will be
necessary, alternate solutions to contact tracing exclusive of specific
apps may be the better solution. As mentioned earlier in this Article,342

336

Id. at 1.
Katie Canales, Sen. Ron Wyden Is Introducing a Privacy Bill that Would Ban Government
Agencies from Buying Personal Information from Data Brokers, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2020, 4:15
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ron-wyden-fourth-amendment-is-not-for-sale-privacy2020-8 [https://perma.cc/CFB6-8BSQ].
338 ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., ENSURING DATA PRIVACY AS WE BATTLE COVID-19,
(2020),
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/ensuring-data-privacy-as-we-battlecovid-19-36c2f31e [https://perma.cc/8NFJ-LM75].
339 Harvard Univ. Priv. Tools Project, Differential Privacy, HARV. UNIV., https://
privacytools.seas.harvard.edu/differential-privacy [https://perma.cc/W9LA-XDQ7].
340 Id.
341 Divya Ramjee & Maimuna Majumder, Position Statement, in NCVHS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY: COMMENTS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR COMMENT 3–4 (Sept. 10, 2020), https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Public%
20Comments-NCVHS%20Privacy,%20Confidentiality%20&%20Security%20MeetingSeptember%2014,%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HEU4-3RA6].
342 See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
337
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some countries are experimenting with wearable proximity tracking
devices that would provide a level of scalability for this
consideration.343 Facial recognition technology has been suggested as
a possible alternative to utilizing Bluetooth or location tracking
technologies for contact tracing.344 This idea though has not gained
traction, particularly considering the risks highlighted in Part III of this
Article, and a New York bill was introduced which would ban the use
of facial technology to track the spread of COVID-19.345
Some countries have implemented the use of location-based QR
code check-ins to assist in exposure notification and contact tracing
efforts.346 However, New Zealand has faced hurdles implementing this
strategy due to the fact that it requires individuals to proactively scan
their devices to check in to premises.347 Adoption hurdles have also
arisen among businesses because this inefficient system can cause
long queues of customers.348 To address problems like this, the United
Kingdom is rolling out a hybrid solution.349 Their decentralized
proximity detection app based on the GAEN API also contains a
separate QR-code feature, as well as a symptom-tracking feature.350
Such an app could be a feasible option for the United States, since it
343

See Asher, supra note 119.
Jacob Ward & Chiara Sottile, A Facial Recognition Company Wants to Help with Contact
Tracing. A Senator Has Questions, NBC NEWS, (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:29 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/facial-recognition-company-wants-help-contact-tracing-senatorhas-questions-n1197291 [https://perma.cc/3D32-KCQP].
345 S. S8311, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2020) (introduced by State Senator Kevin Thomas
on May 11, 2020). This bill “[r]elates to banning the use of facial recognition technology in the
tracking of the coronavirus (COVID-19).” Id.
346 Coronavirus: England and Wales’ Contact-Tracing App Gets Launch Date, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54118022 [https://perma.cc/YW9ZXN6X]; see also NZ COVID Tracer App, MINISTRY OF HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2020), https://
www.health.govt.nz/our-work/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-novel-coronavirus/covid-19resources-and-tools/nz-covid-tracer-app [https://perma.cc/86R3-YKNX]; QR Codes for Contact
Tracing: How to Fight the Spread of Corona, SCANOVA BLOG, https://scanova.io/blog/qr-codesfor-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/NX7W-LGVZ].
347 Bronwyn Howell, A Tale of Two Contact-Tracing Apps: Lessons from Australia and New
Zealand, AM. ENTER. INST. (May 22, 2020), https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/atale-of-two-contact-tracing-apps-lessons-from-australia-and-new-zealand
[https://perma.cc/
K48N-BPHR].
348 Id.
349 Leo Kelion, Coronavirus: England’s Contact Tracing App Trial Gets Under Way, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53765240 [https://perma.cc/
TMQ2-BLAJ].
350 Id.
344
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would be easy to facilitate across all states, and would already have
international implementation. However, limitations remain with a user
still needing an app-supported mobile device to participate.
Another potential tracking option that has not been as widely
discussed is the use of near field communication (NFC). Similar to
Bluetooth technology, NFC allows for the remote transfer of
information between devices.351 NFC is unique in that devices can
require a physical engagement with a “tag” to transfer data.352 This
gives consumers more control over when their information is
broadcasted, in comparison to Bluetooth’s continuous broadcasting.353
Further, NFC inherently provides reassurance that physical proximity
actually occurred.354 However, as mentioned in Part II of this Article,
user adoption and engagement are major hurdles to overcome, and
NFC-based apps require that users actively want to use the app
compared to passive transmission with Bluetooth and GPS.355
Nevertheless, in considering between GPS, Bluetooth, or NFC, both
the FTC and FCC should be involved from a regulatory standpoint.356
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the United States needs to supplement traditional
public health response efforts with the powerful utility of digital
contact tracing tools, especially as we continue to develop strategies
to reopen the country. With digital exposure notification and contact
tracing relying completely on the identification of positive SARSCoV-2 diagnoses, we must increase the availability and use of highsensitivity, fast testing across the country. Additionally, although the
United States’ public is divided on using cellphones for exposure
notification and contact tracing, the majority express disapproval over
351 Simon Hill, What Is NFC? Here’s Everything You Need to Know, DIGIT. TRENDS (Dec. 2,
2020), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/what-is-nfc [https://perma.cc/5CFH-F7DD].
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Cf. FTC STAFF, PAPER, PLASTIC… OR MOBILE?: AN FTC WORKSHOP ON MOBILE
PAYMENTS (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/paper-plastic-ormobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments/p0124908_mobile_payments_workshop_report_02-2813.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JVJ-TP6K].
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using mobile device data to track an individual’s movements for
compliance with public health measures.357 What may help shift public
trust in, and facilitate use of, these tools is specific regulation in this
area, buy-in from respected community leaders, and consistent
messaging about the importance of doing what is best for ourselves
and our society as a whole. In order to promote ideals of social good
and unity, we must ensure that these tools are to be used only for public
health initiatives. It is critical to understand that “[t]he power to do
good things increases as we share information, but we need
frameworks.”358 COVID-19 is merely a moment in a continuing
spectrum of possible pandemics, and creating an effective contact
tracing network at the national level now will not only help contain
COVID-19 in the present, but also better prepare the United States to
address future emerging infectious diseases.

357
358

Auxier, supra note 143.
O’Neill, supra note 112.

